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Education voucher p|ans are

V.

a

Fanslow
form of educational fi-

nance through which educational funding agencies subsidize

students rather than schools.

Students may spend their vouchers

at any school, within certain limits.

The resulting competition

among schools is designed to improve educational quality by

allowing market forces to reward better choices and to penalize
weaker ones.
The theoretical considerations motivating current voucher

proposals are examined.

The historical development of the idea

is traced from the eighteenth century to the present.

alternative proposals are presented.

Seven

The (Milton) Friedman

Proposal and the Center for the Study of Public Policy Proposal
are both examined in detail, along with discussions of the

criticisms each has drawn.
A

field study was conducted in Alum Rock, California,

site of the only existing voucher demonstration at the time of

writing.

The chief objectives of the field study are

a

com-

parison of the demonstration with the CSPP Proposal, upon which
it is modelled,

and an examination of how the theoretical issues

site.
have developed into practical issues at the demonstration

Uide differences between theory and practice are noted.

V

The field demonstration varies so
greatly from its theoretical
model that it cannot be judged a valid
test of the ideas uhich
motivated it.

Current legislative action on education
vouchers is
examined. Although vouchers have not been
popular among legislators, the voters in New Hampshire have agreed
to try

voucher demonstration.

a

That project promises to be a more

accurate replication than the Alum Rock demonstration.
A

complete evaluation of the New Hampshire demonstrations

would indicate whether the theoretical considerate ns whic

h

motivated current voucher projects are valid, an objective
which the present study was unable to achieve.

Although con-

ceptual analysis indicated the validity of the ideas uhich
have entailed the use of vouchers, those ideas have yet to
be tested in the empirical realm.
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CHAPTER

I

REVIEU OF CURRENT LITERATURE:

HISTORY AND DESCRIPTION OF CURRENT ALTERNATIVES

Education vouchers are the source of much current

discussion.

As a pilot project in Alum Rock, California

begins its third year of operation, the voucher plan is being
hailed by some observers as the most revolutionary change to
visit American education in many decades.

Agreement is less

certain as to the merits of the revolution ue are witnessing.
The central idea behind current voucher programs and

proposals is quite simple and straightforward.

Under voucher

plans, the local education authority subsidizes the student

rather than the school.

Each family with school-aged child-

ren receives a voucher worth the cost of educating
in that district.

a

child

This voucher can then be redeemed at any

school selected by the parents.
Those favoring such plans feel that the increase in

familial options will benefit both the student and the educ-

ational system. Presumably poorer schools will fail to be
chosen and will wither away.

Meanwhile, market forces will

bring into being educational entrepreneurs who will compete
with each other and with existing educational institutions
to offer more and better educational services.

Critics point out that such programs will or may open
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the door to unethical hucksters.

Critics express grave doubts

that competition necessarily improves
education.

They often

hold strong reservations concerning
the uses to which such plans
can be put in furthering racial segregation.
Concerns have also

arisen that such plans might be used to break
down the barrier
between church and state.
Before turning to

a

discussion of the merits of the

arguments for and against various voucher proposals, we must
place the idea in its historical context.

Voucher schemes are

quite old and have been supported, and are currently supported,
by theorists who find very little else to agree upon.

For example, Adam Smith, the father of classical economics,

and Christopher Jencks, who has been called

both proposed voucher plans.

a

socialist, have

Milton Friedman, the eminent lib-

ertarian economist, and Thomas Paine, the eminent defender of
revolutions, both favor vouchers.

Throughout this chapter the remarkable differences among
various voucher proponents will become evident.

In general,

quite different philosophical approaches can be discerned.
one hand are proponents who argue from

libertarian position.

a

two
On

free market, antistatist,

The statements of Adam Smith, 3ohn Stuart

Mill, and Milton Friedman fall into this category.
hand there are many theorists of

a

different stripe.

On the other

Their
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position is reformist, interventionist, and humanitarian.
Plans presented by Thomas Paine, Christopher Oencks,
Theodore

Sizer and others fall into this category.
Adam Smith (1776) is generally credited with the first

expression of the voucher idea.

Smith uas discussing the

benefits to the state*s commercial well being which the general education of its citizens can bring.

Always fearful of

the debilitating influence of monopolies against human

improvement as he conceived it, Smith noted:
The public can facilitate this acquisition
(of education) by establishing in every
parish or district a little school where
children may be taught for a reward so moderate, that even a common laborer may afford
it; the master being partly but not wholly
paid by the public; because if he were
wholly or even principally paid by it, he
would soon learn to neglect his business, (p. 370)

Indeed, the charge that teachers have learned to neglect their business is implicit in some dicsussions of voucher

plans.

Needless to say, teachers are most resentful of such

implications, real or imagined. Teacher unions have been the
most vociferous, if not the ablest, critics of voucher proposals •
It will be noted that Smith's suggestion falls short

of a modern voucher proposal.

He suggested that the funds

for the support of teachers are to be only principally pri-

vate.

However, the suggestion is only a step removed from
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modern proposals, which currently would
have the state supply
funds to individuals,
A

more explicit statement of a voucher plan
came

soon after Smith from Thomas Paine,

In The Rights of Man

(1925) Paine undertakes a defense of the then recent
French

Revolution,

His discussion led him to an analysis of the

unhappy lot of the poor.

In the course of pointing out the

unfair tax burden carried by the poor, Paine recommended that
the government order a remission of taxes
to every poor family out of the surplus
taxes and in room of poor rates, four
pounds a year for every child under fourteen years of age; enjoining the parents
of such children to send them to school,
to learn reading, writing, and common
arithmetic; the ministers of every parish,
of every denomination to certify jointly
to an office for that purpose that their
duty is performed, (p, 54)
No doubt the plan was considered too radical, involving

as it did the remission of taxes.

Since the poor had no

representation at the time - only male property holders over
tuenty-one were enfranchised in England and America - it
is not surprising that a program so much in their interest,

and with no apparent gain for those in power, should have

been passed over.
Half a century later, John Stuart Mill proposed a

voucher plan for reasons rather different from either of his
two predecessors.

Smith favored vouchers as an efficient
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means of contributing to the commercial
welfare of the state.
Also, as a free market economist, he
favored programs which
allowed for the free flow of private funds.
Paine was

interested in vouchers as a means to expand social
justice.
Mill (1909), however, favors the use of vouchers
as a means
to limit the control of the state in the lives
of its citizens.

This antistatist motivation finds its strongest contemporary

statement in Friedman (1962), although it is present in others.
Mill states:
That the whole or any large part of the
education of the people should be in
State hands, I go as far as anyone in
deprecating. All that has been said of
the importance of individuality of
character, and the diversity of opinions
and modes of conduct, involves, as of
the same unspeakable importance, diversity
of education.
A general state education
is a mere contrivance for moulding people
to be exactly like one another. ... An
education established and controlled by
the state should only exist, if it exists
at all, as one among many competing experiments, carried on for the purpose of example and stimulus, to keep' the others up
to a certain standard of excellence. ...
But, in general, if the country contains
sufficient number of persons qualified
to provide education under government
auspices, the same persons would be able
and willing to give an equally good education on the voluntary principle, under the
assurance of remuneration afforded by a law
rendering education compulsory, combined with
State aid to those unable to defray the
expense, (pp. 315-6)
a

It is not exaggerating to say that no statement in
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favor of vouchers has surpassed
Mill's in force or clarity.
The entire pro-voucher position is
there in a nutshell,
written over a hundred years before the
present controversy
got under way.
The salient points of the argument are
reflected in

more technical prose by Friedman (1962).

An educational

system run by the state will tend to become uniform.
Uniformity of education tends to cause uniformity of
character.

Yet diversity of character, of opinions, and of conduct
is

the hallmark of a free society.

Therefore, let those who

can qualify as employees of the State become instead the

employees of individuals. Mill would have parents pay teachers
directly rather than indirectly through taxation. Our dis-

cussion of Friedman will reflect these same points.
No other written mention of voucher proposals was made

until 1926 when

a

Cardinal Bourne suggested that British

education could be improved through government subsidies of
the poor which would permit them to attend parochial schools
if they so chose.
In 1962,

Milton Friedman devoted

a

chapter of

Capitalism and Freedom to a discussion of the role of government in education.

He and his son wrote a number of popular

articles on the subject during the next few years.

By the

late 1960*3 a number of alternative proposals began to

emerge, no doubt stimulated by Friedman*s initial arguments.
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In 1966,

Jencka discussed voucher plans
as

a

means

Of providing equal educational
opportunity to the poor and to

racial minority groups,

Coleman (1967) expressed his belief

that programs designed to increase
educational diversity
were urgently needed.

Sizer and Uhitten (1968) authored an
article titled
"A Proposal for a Poor Children's
Bill of Rights."
They

argued in fav/or of

a

program through which the federal gov-

ernment could supply each family with $1500 in
educational
funds for each child.

This amount could be supplemented up

to a total of $4300 per child as family incomes
lowered.

They argued that our goal should not be equal educational

opportunity but equal educational attainment for children of
all racial and ethnic groups.

They suggested that the fifteen

billion dollar annual costs would repay themselves in unforeseen social benefits.

During the next year Sizer (1969) wrote another

influential article in which he argued for
educational services.

a

free market for

Arguing that the political structure

and context of a school have an effect upon the quality of

learning taking place within it, Sizer suggested that by
giving parents influence in directing the school, students
would gain unforeseeable benefits.

Levin (1968) claimed that the public schools had
failed in their task and proposed the free market as the
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remedy.

Lev/in

presented

a

detailed argument in fav/or of

economic discrimination in fav/or of the
poor using the device
of allotting to them vouchers of
larger cash value than
those of the wealthier classes.
In the process of presenting
his position. Levin made the first
detailed criticisms of

Priedman*s initial proposal.

The nature of his criticisms

will be discussed in detail in Chapter II.

Arguments in favor of experimentation with education

vouchers continued to expand in the late 1960*s and early
1970*3.

Kenneth Clark (1968), writing for the Harvard

Education Review, made one of the strongest statements on
record in favor of introducing competition into the educatioal

system.

He said,

"As long as local school systems can be

assured of state aid and increasing federal aid without the

accountability which
it would be

.

.

...

comes with aggressive competition,

wishful thinking to expect any significant

.

increase in the efficiency of our public schools." (p.111)

Meanwhile
had developed.

a

sizeable literature critical of vouchers

Fox and Levenson (1969) take the straight-

forward approach that the public schools have done more good
than harm and do not deserve to be eliminated or to lose

state support to what may be another educational fad.

Kornegay (1968) notes that voucher plans offer no

motive for improvement on the part of the schools.

He

suggests that the most likely competitor of the public school
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system is the parochial school system.

Since he feels that

parochial schools may be lower in educational
quality than
the public schools, he does not foresee great
gains
to be

won through the use of education vouchers.

Lutz (1971) has indicated that free markets are
no

guarantee of positive results.

He notes that free markets

have not produced safe cars or pure drugs.

Dentler (1971)

has pointed out that the poorest sections of a large city

like New York could offer no educational alternative to a

consumer.
Arguing against Friedman’s claim that educational

entrepreneurs will arise to compete for the vouchers of the
poor, Ginzberg (1971) points out that the necessary entre-

preneurial skills are relatively rare.
Selden (1971) has predicted that vouchers will cause
•u

money to flow away from ghettos.

He fears that such programs

will divert attention from the real problems of schools and

children.

Krystal and Henrie (1972) are convinced that

voucher programs will undermine the public schools, create

greater racial segregation, and violate constitutional prohibitions against state support of religion.

They feel that

reliance upon parental judgement in the making of educational
choices is unsound.

Clayton(l970) anticipated the same

objections in somewhat less detail.
Shanker (1971) argues that once

a

voucher experiment
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is begun, the process of its
expansion will become irreversible.
He predicts that public schools
mill degenerate and
uill be selected only as schools
of

last resort.

Shanker,
like Clayton and Henris, predicted
that a voucher program
could nev/er be approved.

Each of the objections described above has
been re-

peated in various other articles.

In addition,

a

iety of descriptive literature has been
written.

wide varFor a time,

voucher proposals were made with great frequency,
each one
greatly similar to its predecessors.

Each new proposal pro-

duced a rash of descriptive articles which attempted to keep
the readers of the various journals current with developments
in the voucher controversy.

Such articles are useful to the

student of the history of the voucher concept and are cited
in the Bibliography.

To cite each one here would appear to

serve no useful purpose.
By far the most influential work in the field of educ-

ation vouchers is "Education Vouchers: Financing Education
by Grants to Parents"

( 1

970 )

.

Prepared for the Office of

Economic Opportunity by the Center for the Study of Public
Policy (CSPP) under the direction of Christopher Jencks, the
report discusses current alternative voucher proposals,

analyses legal and social problems, and proposes
voucher plan to be used as

a

a

specific

model by the 0E0 as it develops
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experimental pilot projects.
The CSPP report distinguished the
following seven

voucher models.
Ihe Unregulated Market Mod»l

(

The Friedman Proposal)

In any school district, the total cost
of educating

all children is divided by the number of
children to be educ-

ated.

The resulting figure is the value of each voucher,

every child receiving an equal share.

Parents may supplement

this amount as they wish and as they are able.

Schools are

free to charge tuition at any rate they see fit.
2)

The Compensatory Unregulated Market Model

This model is similar to 1) except that poorer students

receive vouchers worth larger cash amounts.

Parents may

still supplement voucher payments as they can and wish.

Schools may charge whatever the traffic will bear.

In this

way, proponents of this plan hope to prevent better schools

from being bid away from economically disadvantaged students.

Since the publication of the CSRP report,

a

new

wrinkle has been introduced to this plan by Goddard and
Goffman (1971) which is introduced here for the sake of

completeness
2a) Compensatory Price Competition Model

This model is similar to 1) except that parents receive
a refund of some of the money they spend over and above the
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value of the voucher.

If the percentage of refund
is high

enough and if the schedule of refunds
is sufficiently regressive, the plan may offer compensation to
those uith little
or no money to spend on education.
3)

The Compens atory Private Scholarship Model

Vouchers are distributed equally as in model
1).

Schools may charge as they see fit but must not
discriminate

against those uho cannot pay.

They must offer scholarships

to those unable to pay full tuition.
4)

The Effort Voucher Model

Schools operate at four levels of cost

to

parents.

For example, four schools, otherwise equal, operate at costs
of 8600, $900, $1200, and $1500 per year, respectively.

Families will be taxed for the operation of the school system
on the basis of their ability to pay and on the basis of the

amount they have chosen to spend.

Thus, a wealthy family

choosing the least expensive school would be taxed at
high rate.

A

a

very

poor family choosing an expensive school would

be taxed at a very low rate, or not at all.

In any case,

poor

families are charged less for educational expenses than are

wealthy families and receive equal access to educational
facilities.

In this way,

through

a

kind of indirect voucher,

equal educational facilities are cheaper for the poor than
for the rich.

A

very similar plan is called by its authors

Family Power Assistance.
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5

)

The Egalitarian Nodal

Every child receives a voucher
equal in value to that
Of every other.
Every school participating in
the program
must charge tuition at the same
rate, uhich must be equal to
the value of every voucher.
Schools may not discriminate
against students in any uay.
6)

The Achievement Model

The value of a voucher is proportional
to the rate of

the student's progress in school.

Those uho are gaining the

largest benefits from school mill have
additional funds to
make even better use of the schools.
7

)

The Regulated Compensatory Model

Vouchers are distributed unequally, the larger vouchers

going to the poorest families.

Schools may not charge tuition

at a rate higher than the value of the smallest voucher.

However, when a school accepts a poor child, it may keep the

entire value of the voucher.

Thus, schools can earn addition-

al income by accepting a large number of economically dis-

advantaged children.
An Education Voucher Authority oversees the program to

distribute information and to insure that schools are not
practicing racial or ethnic discrimination.

The Voucher

Authority redeems vouchers for cash and can refuse to do so
in the case of a school uhich violates any of the authority's

regulations •
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Each of these proposals has
gathered or is gathering
its oun group of educates.
Uhile it seems clear that each
position derives from a «.ll thought
out foundation, it seems
equally clear that each plan uill
appeal most directly
to a

particular economic class or to a particular
political viewpoint *
Those favoring discrimination in favor
of the poor at
the expense of the rich are likely to
favor plans similar
to 3) the Compensatory Private Scholarship
Model, 4) The

Effort Voucher Model, and 7) The Regulated
Compensatory
Model.

Those who oppose discrimination for or against
any

group obviously prefer plan 5) The Egalitarian Model.

Those

uith excess funds available for educational expenses
and

those uho prefer non-public schools are likely to favor plans
like l) The Unregulated Market Model.

Compromise positions

are offered by 2) The Compensatory Market Model and by 6) The

Achievement Model, each in rather different ways.
The next chapter contains an examination of the tuo

most influential voucher proposals.
1)

and 7) above.

Included uill be plans

The Unregulated Market Model (The Friedman

Proposal) has been included because it is the oldest con-

temporary voucher scheme and because it has had the greatest
influence on alternative proposals.

In fact,

it can be said

fairly that every other current proposal represents

a

reaction
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Of some kind to the Friedman
plan.

Plana

2) through 7) are
each different attempts to modify
the impact and to redirect
the effects which their authors
believed would result from the

unleashing of free market forces upon
the distribution of educational resources. Finally, the
Friedman Proposal has drawn
much fire from those proposing
alternative voucher plans
and from those who reject voucher
plans unconditionally.

For

these reasons, the Friedman Proposal
offers an interesting
field for study.
The other plan to be discussed in Chapter
II is 7)

The Regulated Compensatory Model (CSPP Proposal).

This model

has been selected because it offers the most
comprehensive

correction of the faults perceived by critics in the
Friedman
Proposal.

At the same time, it seems possible that the CSPP

Proposal can offer many of the benefits claimed for the original Friedman plan.

Equally important, this model has been

chosen for discussion because it bears the closest resemblance
to the experimental pilot project operating in Alum Rock,

California.

The Alum Rock project is the only voucher plan

operating in the United States at the time of this writing.
A

further reason for selecting these two plans is that

they represent better than any other pair of plans listed the

fascinating contrast in motivations which is the historical
mark of voucher proposals.

The Friedman Proposal draws
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directly on the free market,
laissez-faire , antistatist,
libertarian tradition which is
characterized,

if not defined,

in the writings of Smith and
Mill.

The CSPP Proposal draws

heavily on the reformist, interventionist,
radical tradition
characterized by Thomas Paine.
The major emphasis of the Friedman
Proposal is the
remov/al of the perceived perniciousness
of government manage-

ment from the schools.

Equally important is the unleashing

of free market forces, a perceived virtue
on the part of

Friedman.

Uhile these elements are not totally transformed

in the CSPP Proposal, they are clearly not the
same.

The

chief emphasis and purpose of the CSPP Proposal is the

creation of conditions of equality of educational opportunity.
This goal is not necessarily inconsistent with government

management of the schools.

The authors of the CSPP Proposal

uill claim that their goal is net consistent with government

monopoly over education.
Put another way, it is a premise of the Friedman Pro-

posal that educational resources uill be distributed unequally.
The rich can afford to bid the price of such resources higher

than the poer can afford to pay.
if not all, resources.

This is the case uith many,

It is a natural and expected result

from uhich Friedman does not flinch.

On the other hand, it

is a prime motivation of the CSPP Proposal that such unequal

distributions do not occur.
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Before turning to

discussion of these tuo voucher
proposals, it will be uell to point
out that not all the literature
Uouchers is involved in argument,
advocacy, and theoretical
considerations. The major exception
a

to the rule is a formal

evaluation of the Alum Rock voucher
demonstration undertaken by
the Rand Corporation (Santa Monica,
California) for the National
Institute of Education (NIE).
(At the time the contract
uas

made, the demonstration project uas
administered by the Office
of Economic Opportunity and uas
transferred to NIE in a governmental reorganization.)
The technical plan for conducting the evaluation
uas

completed in 1972 and is titled "Technical Analysis Plan
for

Evaluation of the 0E0 Elementary Education Voucher Demonstration:
Technical Dissertation."

Some of the results of the evaluation,

chiefly those concerned uith attitudes of parents and professional
personnel, have been released by NIE in

a

report uritten by its

director, Thomas Glidden, in December, 1973.

Unfortunately, the

main body of the report, though promised for early 1974, uas
not available from government depositories at the time of this

uriting (October, 1974).

The results uhich are available uill

be produced in Chapter IV.

Because the Rand Study is going to produce findings of

major importance for future voucher programs, at least of the
Alum Rock variety, some attention needs to be devoted to the

technical plan used for arriving at those findings, uhatever
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they may be.
The Study is an elegant
piece of educational evaluation.
.
Its ultimate purpose is to
find the ansuers to the
following

five policy questions.

Uhat iS the desirabi lity of
implementing
ln n,= mechanisms
t
some
whereby parents can have a
ireC V/0 e in choosin the schools
9
thei]
rhnH^
iS
children attend?
,

-

h

2
Hou should educational diversity,
especially the creation of new schools, be
encouraged by public policy, if at all?
3.. Should some form of public support for
private and parochial schools be initiated,
and if so, uhat form should it take?
4,
To uhat extent should ’Marketplace" incentives be introduced into education, and
uhat form, if any, should such incentives take?
To uhat extent are a) vouchers and b) the
5.
manner in which vouchers were implemented in the
EEl/D (Elementary Education Voucher Demonstration)
a necessary and sufficient device for the
attainment of the objectives of public policy,
including those which are the subject of questions
1-4 above?
( p . 9

The ansuers to these general questions are deemed to be

dependent on the ansuers to the following six questions, which
are labelled "demonstration-specific."
Uhat has been the effect of vouchers on the education
1.
of elementary students, especially the disadvantaged?

Uhat is the effect on the available range
2.
of choice among school programs?
Uhat is the impact of the demonstration on
equality of educational opportunity?
3.

Uhat has been the impact of the demonstration
4.
on the economics of public education?
Hou has the demonstration affected the relation5.
ship between citizens and schools?
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6.
Uhat has been the impact of
the demonstration
on social and political
tensions?

(p.

10)

The answers to these
questions depends, of course, on

information developed in the course
of the study.
In order to
systematise this information twelve
,
information categories were
developed. They are:
Educational results,
Attitudes of practitioners,
Programs and processes,
Attributes of new schools,
Distribution of students,
Allocation of resources,
Financial impact,
Governance and administration,
9. Status of professionals,
10. Parent attitudes and responses,
11. Commynity attitudes and responses, and
12. Consequences beyond the demonstration area.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

A

(p.ll)

chart is given (p. 13) which relates the six
demonsration

specific questions to the information categories.

In this way,

the plan can predetermine which categories of information
are

relevant to the answering of which questions.
For example, the answer to question

1

will be derived

from information in categories 1,2, 3, 4,
6, and 7; question

2

requires information from categories 3,4,5, and 12; while question
(p.

6

requires information from categories 8,9,10,11, and 12.

13)

Forty outcome dimensions are listed.

These dimensions

are the smallest units used in the synthesis of information.
They are grouped into three categories

—

Political/Social

(thirty dimensions), Economic/Cost (five dimensions), and
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Educational (five dimensions).
Examples of the first type of
dimension are
assessm ent of local schools,
Administrative practices and behavior,
aren
°PJ nions on integration,*
iq
19. £
Parent mobility,
i y at
tUd S ° n
29 * i/oting
?° litical activism,9 and
Sotinn behavior,
h h
?
(p. 14)
*

o
8.

!:

“

Examples of the second type of
dimension are

Behavioral changes in educational
suppliers,
Changes in resource allocations, and
Changes in fiscal flows, (p. 15;

2.
4.
5.

Examples of the final type of dimension
are

Cognitive achievement,
Teaching plans and practices, and
Sociology of the classroom, (p. 15)

1#
4.
5.
A

second chart relates the information categories to

the outcome dimensions in the same uay that the
demonstration-

specific questions were related to the information categories.
Thus,

information category

1

is related to outcome dimensions

1.2.4, and 17 (Political/Social)
3.4, and

5

(Educational).

;

3

(Economic/Cost); and 1,2,

Information category

related

4 is

to outcome dimensions 1,2,3,8,9,11,12,15, and 18 (Political/

Social); 1,2,3, and

4

(Economic/Cost); and 3,4, and

Having built

a

ladder downwards from policy to information,

5

(Educational).

the process can be reversed once the information is collected.

Once the information has been collected to determine the out-

come in each of the forty outcome dimensions, it becomes possible
to synthesize upwards through the information categories, past

the

demonstration-specific questions and finally to arrive at
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answers to the broad questions
of policy to which the
study
is meant to address itself.
The technical plan for performing
an evaluation of the
Alum Rock project is a magnificent
edifice, a model of what
a

"hardheaded" educational evaluation
should look like.
It
should be pointed out here that the
present study is not an
attempt to replicate or duplicate the
Rand Study.
While the
purpose of the Rand Study was to find
answers to some broad
questions of governmental and public policy,
the purpose of this
paper is to compare theoretical projections
of a voucher project with an actual, operational design.
Something like this is
Rand Study.

a

secondary objective of the

Early in the report, the authors indicate that one

purpose of the evaluation is the verification of uhat they
call the "Theory of Voucher Intervention." (p.
5) The basic

thesis of this theory is that "changes brought about by the

voucher arrangement will cause improvement in student achievement and related educational outcomes." (p/ 5)
A

thesis.

causal series is presented which generates the desired
It runs as follows.

Vouchers will create parental

choice which will create incentives to create new schools.
These new schools will give parents an even wider choice of

programs.

Since parents have

trol over schooling.

a

wider choice, they can gain con-

Their greater control will lead to pub-

lic and private school innovations.

The innovations will pro-
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duce greater parent satisfaction
uith schools.
Increased congruence between parental preferences
and school outcomes will
improve students' cognitive and
non-congnitive achievements.
The series is perhaps not as
tightly joined as a chemist
would like, but it is good enough
for its purpose.
The question
remains as to whether the Alum Rock
demonstration constitutes
a good test of the theory.
The conclusion of this paper
a little further along
will be that it is not.

—

For this

reason the beautiful structure of the Rand
Study is going to
be wasted, since the information gleaned
will have little to do
with vouchers as they have been discussed in
these pages and

everywhere else outside of Alum Rock.
The nature of the demonstration project makes it
impossible
to shou that vouchers are either a necessary or a
sufficient

condition of the benefits produced by the voucher demonstration.
In the causal series given above,

the statement "student^' cog-

nitive and non-cognitive achievements improve” is to be entailed
by a conjunction of all the other statements in the series.
If vouchers are a necessary condition of the desired

improvements, then failure to meet the antecedent conditions
should mean that the conclusion faili to obtain.

antecedent conditions were not met.

In fact,

the

The vouchers used in Alum

Rock were quite different from anything used or discussed in
the wide literature on the subject.

To say more about them would

be to get far ahead of the story, but the fact remains that if
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the expected educational
improvements occur

every reason to suppose that they
will

—

—

and there is

the claim cannot be

made that vouchers uere necessary
to the outcome.
Of course, this is hardly a
very damaging conclusion.

Even the firmest believer in education
vouchers must believe,
if only in an unguarded moment,
that educational improvement is
possible in other ways. Uhat is damaging
is the fact that there
uill be no hint whether vouchers constitute
even a sufficient
condition for educational success.

First of all, since uhat

I

uill call quasi-vouchers uere

used, all conclusions as to their sufficiency uill
deal uith
them, and not uith true vouchers.

More important, the Rand

Study uill not be able to demonstrate, although they may try,
that even quasi-vouchers uere

a

sufficient condition of the

beneficial changes, assuming that they uere actually measured.
Many of the qualities to be tested existed in the community

before the advent of vouchers.
of the study,

Of course,

this is not the fault

but of those uho chose the site for a demonstration.

They may be forgiven if ue remember that Alum Rock uas the only

district in the country to agree to try vouchers.

If the 0E0

had decided not to use Alum Rock for the stodgy reason that it

failed to offer ideal test conditions, there uould be no demon-

stration at all.
§

Nevertheless, the qualities uhich vouchers uere to produce uere already firmly established in Alum Rock before the
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project arrived.

Parents uere already highly
involved in
school activities. Administrators
uere happy, f or th9 most
part »
to have them so involved
and uere anxious to uork
uith teachers
to meet parents' needs.
Further, teachers themselves
expressed
the uish to develop innovative
programs and techniques
but uere

hampered by a lack of funds.
All these things came to pass
uhen vouchers arrived in
Alum Rock.
It may not be fair to claim
even that vouchers acted
as a catalyst, enabling these
hidden properties to emerge. For
uhen vouchers came to Alum Rock, sos
did large amounts of federal
money to finance the project. These funds
uere poured into
schools. The effects of large amounts of money
pouring into a
poor school district aching to innovate can
be imagined uithout
the technical mechanisms of the Rand Study.

The existence of

the funds alone ought to invalidate the findings in
the five

Economic/Cost dimensions and may uell ruinvany generalizations
to be made from findings in other areas.

The data uhich the Study will present will be muddied by

these considerations.

Since NIE is likely to be impressed uith

results and not uith theoretical niceties,

a

successful conclusion

to the Alum Rock project uill probably mean many other similar

quasi-voucher projects.
this study.

However, this need not be the concern of

Ue uill be concerned uith comparing the project to

the theoretical concerns uhich fathered it.

Although the discussion of the Rand Study has necessitated
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anticipating our conclusions,
the following points
should be
borne in mind.
Becsuse the conditions in
Alum Rock produced
voucher program significantly
different from theoretical
projections
so much so that the propriety
of using the term
"voucher" in describing it is
questionable
the application
of the Rand findings to the
"Theory of Voucher Intervention"
may well be inappropriate.
Nevertheless, the Study may well
offer a recommendation to NIE that
programs similar to Alum
Rock's are a useful uay of producing
beneficial educational
change
a

~

-

To that extent,

the purposes of the Rand Study and the

present investigation diverge.

The purpose of this paper is

the comparison of a living model with its
theoretical projection.
The fact that the Alum Rock project produced
educational benefits

will be of little interest to this paper since our
findings

indicate that the project is not
uith which ue are concerned.

a

valid test of the principles

This same fact may be of central

interest to Rand and NIE.
The plan for the remainder of the paper is as follows.

Chapter

II

will present the Friedman Proposal and the CSPP

Proposal in detail.

Equal attention will be paid to the many

criticisms levelled at these two proposals.

Chapter III will

present the plan used for the field study at Alum Rock and Chapter
IV will present the findings.

Chapter

V

will evaluate the findings,

review current legislation on vouchers, and look ahead at fresh

possibilities for a true test of education vouchers.
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CHAPTER

II

TUO PROPOSALS AND THEIR
CRITICS

Section

1

The Friedman Proposal

Critics outnumber advocates of the
Friedman Proposal
by a uide margin.
Because the plan makes no provision
for a
guarantee that educational resources
uill be distributed among
the population on anything resembling
an equal basis,
the plan

is unlikely to gather the support
of federal government

agencies.

Uithout such support, it appears unlikely
that any
vouchor programs uill be implemented*
Therefore, our discussion of the Friedman Proposal
uill not assume that it is ready for implementation.
ue uill treat it as a body of ideas.

Rather,

By increasing our under-

standing of the plan, ue uill gain ground in understanding
the more complex CSPP Proposal, many of uhose provisions have

been motivated by a negative reaction touards the Friedman
plan.
The chief arguments in favor of the Friedman Proposal

are contained in tuo documents.

Chapter six of Capitalism

and F reedom (1962), titled "The Role of Government in Educ-

ation" is the most important of the tuo.

The second is "The

Case for a Voucher System" (1970) by David Friedman, son of
the noted economist.

References to "Friedman" are to Milton
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Friedman unless otherwise
noted.
It uas noted previously
that Friedman fits easiiy
into

the roomy category of
laissez-faire antistatism. He
countenances only a limited role for
government. In his vieu, the
job of government is to enforce
contracts, prevent coercion
of one citizen or group by
another, and keep markets free.
A free market is defined
as a system of exchange in
uhich the
price of commodities, goods, and
services is determined by
their supply and demand alone. According
to Friedman, governments are never justified in going beyond
this role except on
three grounds.
1)

They may regulate natural monopolies uhich
cannot

be controlled by laws of supply and demand.
2)

They may attempt to equalize "neighborhood
effects."

Friedman (1962) defines neighborhood effects as

circumstances under uhich the action of
one individual imposes significant costs
on other individuals for uhich it is not
feasible to make him compensate them, or
yields significant gains to other individuals for uhich it is not feasible to
make them compensate him
circumstances
that make voluntary exchange impossible, (pp. 85-6)

—

Friedman offers no examples, but they are not hard to
imagine.

A

factory causes downstream pollution.

It is not

feasible to make the factory*s owners clean the stream.

In

this case Friedman finds grounds for government intervention.
3)

Finally, governments may be justified in expanding
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their role for reasons of
paternalistic concern.

Friedman concedes that it may be
justifiable for governments to enter into the subsidization
of the education of
citizens on grounds of paternalistic
concern. Although such
actions max
justifiable, they extend only to general
education for citizenship which Friedman
distinguishes sharply
from specialized vocational or professional
education.

General education for citizenship includes
the elements
of literacy, mathematics, a knowledge of
history
and of the

nature of civic responsibility.

Government intervention into

this sort of educational activity is justified also
by the

positive neighborhood effects of such education.

Since the

ability of any individual to take on the responsibilities of

citizenship is clearly beneficial to others, the state is
justified in intervening.

Although it is in the interests of the government and
presumably of its citizens to subsidize general education for
citizenship, nothing that has been said so far indicates that
the state is justified in any way in manaqinq the education
of its citizens.

The state may be justified in making capital

expenses available to schools and may be justified in defraying the actual operating costs of education, but the actual

management of the educational enterprise cannot be justified
by an appeal to any of the three grounds for intervention

given above.

It follows that the management and/or ownership
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of schools by the state is
inconsistent with the antistatist

premisses of the argument as set out by
Friedman.
Further, both Friedman's emphasize that
it is right
and proper to allow schools to charge
as much

as they like for

the costs of education.

This will supply those schools which

can attract money with the funds to bid for
better teaching

talent and better educational facilities.

It will also per-

mit parents who wish to and are able to spend more
money for

better educational programs to do so.

The state can guarantee

to all its citizens a minimum level of education.

Those uho

are concerned with educational excellence and uho wish to
go beyond the legally required minimum will be free to do so.

Friedman conceives of specialized vocational education
as an investment in human capital.

Although he does not

favor support of educational institutions or of scholars for

such purposes, he does countenance investment by governments
in human capital.

A

student uho wishes to enter

a

program of

professional training may apply to the government to invest
in his education.

The government might demand in return a

yearly payment of a fixed sum or a fixed percentage of the
student's income for the balance of his working life.

state will be making

a

The

good investment since the student's

payments will come to considerably more than the initial
capital outlay.

At the same time, the student will have an

opportunity to achieve his professional goals and can achieve
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a

significant economic advancement at the
cost of a relatively small percentage of his yearly
income.

Again, none of this

entails that the government is justified
in owning, managing,
or taking an active part in directing
the education of its

citizens

Although Friedman agrees that many educational
options
will be bid auiay from the poor, he also argues
that many neu

opportunities will be made available to them.

According to

Friedman, the poor are currently the victims of an
educational

monopoly.

The only real choice available to them is a

parochial education.

David Friedman points out that such

schools are currently attended by children who are somewhat

poorer than the average child in public schools.

Apparently,

parochial schools offer an option to the lower middle class,
but not to the truly poor.

Ginzberg (1971) has pointed out

that for inner-city Blacks parochial schools are likely to be

distasteful on religious grounds, since most Blacks are Protestant while most parochial schools are Roman Catholic or
Jewish.
As a result of these factors, the truly poor are

offered no options.

They are constrained by laws and by the

whims of geography to attend one particular school.

schools are notoriously ineffective and inefficient.

Ghetto

Minority

group members, who are often identical with the poor, enter

schools at lower levels of achievement than their white,
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:

middle-class contemporaries and leave
farther behind than
uhen they entered, according to
Coleman
(1967).

If racial minority groups, and
the poor generally, uerB

directly subsidized by the government
through the use of education vouchers, they would be freed from the
clutches of an
inefficient monopoly.

Educational entrepreneurs, so goes the

argument, would be attracted to ghettoes in order
to take
advantage of the funds being made available to
families.

Parents would be offered a choice and could select

which seems most likely to benefit their children.

a

program
Schools

would be forced to compete to meet the needs of community members or go under like any other unsuccessful business enter-

prise,

In this way, the options available to any family can

be enhanced and the educational offerings of the schools can
be invigorated by the rigors of competition.

The rich and the well-to-do would also benefit from

such an arrangement.

Because they have more dollars to spend

on educational talent, the rich should be able to buy more

expensive educational programs,
is also true of education.

Uhat is true of any commodity

The more money one has, the more

options become available in selecting any product or service
in the marketplace.

Although inequalities will exist of nec-

essity, these are less objectionable to Friedman than the

inequalities created by

a

slothful monopoly.
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So goes the Friedman scenario.

A

number of critics

have claimed that the plan will do more
harm than good.
will nou turn to an examination of their
arguments.

Section

Ue

2

Critics of the Friedman Proposal

Hegel and Bhaerman (1971) take

against the Friedman Proposal.

a

direct frontal position

They argue that competition,

far from being helpful to educational advancement, is likely
to be detrimental.

They feel that competition may lead to

unprofessional attitudes on the part of teachers.

In their

view teachers may begin to use methods which appeal to parents
and may pay too little attention to more professional aspects
of their work.

If teachers can attract clients through the

use of attractive but ineffective devices, the quality of

instruction may suffer.
Further, they fear that students will be exploited by
a

system in uhich schools may be reduced to rau and ugly

competition to find enough students to stay afloat.

They

predict that teachers will be prevented from trying neu ideas
since school administrators uill be fearful of losing students

through an unsuccessful experiment.
Along the same line Lutz(l97l) points out that com-

petition has not led to the manufacture of safer cars, purer
drugs, or more nutritious food.

On the surface the argument
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is ingenuous since Friedman
is not claiming that
competition

uill necessarily produce safer
schools.

Perhaps Lutz means to say that
competition will not
lead to be tter schools.
In that case the examples
which he
has adduced are poorly selected.
The last half century has
witnessed enormous technological gains
in the fields of transportation, medicine, and nutrition. Clearly,
many of these
gams are due to the fact that manufacturers hope
to capture
a larger share of available markets
by improving their products.
On this interpretation. Lutz* statement
appears to
be false.
At the same time, it must be conceded both to
Lutz and

to Megel and Bhaerman that product improvement is not
the

only strategy employed by manufacturers seeking a larger market share.

Advertising can also be used to effect without in

any way improving the product.

It is possible that schools

uill attempt to entice parents to spend their vouchers through
the use of advertising claims which may be untrue or euphemis-

tic.

Although this may occur, this is not necessarily to say

that competition must produce such results.

Rather it suggests

that regulations may have to be imposed upon the marketplace
to help consumers make intelligent decisions.

Megel and Bhaerman also object that voucher plans will

disperse available educational funds over a larger number of
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institutions, leaving less money
for each institution to
use.
As this argument applies
to Friedman vouchers,
it may be
false.
The Friedman Proposal
provides that parents
can make

additions to their voucher
allotments as they see fit and as
the price of desired educational
programs demands.
It is
possible that the gross amount spent
for education will increase as a result of the use of
Friedman vouchers.
It is also possible that the
number of dollars avail-

able for some classrooms uill shrink.

If private schools,

parochial schools, public schools, and the
schools added by
such educational entrepreneurs as turn up
are all competing
for

total number of dollars even somewhat greater
than the
current amount, it may happen that the amount
available for
a

some classrooms uill diminish.

As students move from public

to non-public schools, the former uill have to
compete more

and more sharply for available dollars.
In uhat sense is this an objection to Friedman's plan?

The point of his voucher proposal is that schools uill be

forced to compete.

Uhat is an objection for Nagel and

Bhaerman is a virtue for Friedman.

His position is that

schools uill have to do a better job to attract
share of

doing

a

a

given market.

a

reasonable

Presumably, if public schools uere

job which pleased parents and students, there would

be no shortage of funds for them when competition with non-
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public schools begins.

Kegel and Bhaerman appear to be

arguing that ue ought not to have
schools might lose.

a

contest which the public

Friedman, like proponents of almost all

other voucher programs, does not attach any
sacred importance
to the existence of public schools.
Dencks
(1966) goes so

far as to say that "if public schools could not
survive in

open competition with private ones, then perhaps they
should
not survive." (p. 27)

This is

a

hard line, to be sure, but

to dispute it ue should have to find some special virtue

which public schools possess which entitles them to their

current monopolistic position.
Kegel and Bhaerman point out that "technical, financial,
and cultural achievements of our society found their basis
in the public schools (p. 31)."

They adduce no hard evidence

in support of this claim, but assume it is true*

If this is

true, it may also be true that these same benefits could con-

tinue to be derived through public schools supported by educ-

ation vouchers.

Presumably the virtue lies in the school

and not in the means of financing it.

Friedman as well as

Jencks can argue that if the public schools are indeed res-

ponsible for such widespread achievements, then the same

market forces which reward l/olkswagens but fail to reward
Dauphines ought to reward the public schools.
Another critic, Ginzberg (1971), notes that voucher
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plana will not help to decrease
inequalities of educational
expenditure among various states or among
different local
districts within states. Uhile this is
true, it is not true
that voucher plans will necessarily exacerbate
the problem.
As long as communities finance education
chiefly through property taxes, the problem will remain. Further,
the problem
is not due to the way in which schools are
financed but to

the way in which the subsidizing agency itself is
financed.

Recent Supreme Court rulings have upheld the validity of
using property taxes to finance education.

Until the ruling

is modified or reversed, this issue is academic,

(it uas far

from being academic at the time Ginzberg uas writing.)
Carr and Hayward (1970) find two grounds upon uhich to

object to the Friedman Proposal.

validity of the

First, they question the

distinction between the public benefits of

education for citizenship and the private benefits of professional education.

It will be recalled that Friedman felt

that government subsidization of scholars uas justifiable
only in the case of general education for citizenship.

The

justifications he cited included legitimate paternalistic
concern on the part of the state and the desire to create

positive neighborhood effects (see pp. 18-20).

Friedman does

not believe that the same considerations apply to the case of

professional or vocational education.
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Carr and Hayward argue that
such
is unnecessarily narrow and
restrictive,

a

view of citizenship
In a modern society

the notion of citizenship and
the notion of useful work may
be bound together.

Apparently Friedman feels that education
for citizenship means equipping the student
with the skills which will
enable him to vote intelligently and to
understand the actions
of his government through the
reading of newspapers
and the

like.

Carr and Hayward seem to perceive the
citizen in more

direct and continuous contact with the agencies
of the state.
His useful work provides direct benefits to
others and
in-

direct benefits through the creation of taxable revenue.

At

the same time, the citizen receives direct and indirect
ben-

efits through the actions of other citizens and through his

government.

In the view of Carr and Hayward, all these ben-

efits may be lost if the state does not help citizens to ob-

tain desired professional and vocational training.
Of course,

Friedman agrees that the state should pro-

vide assistance to its citizens in just this way.

He feels

it is more consistent with the proper role of government for

this assistance to be provided through investment rather than

through subsidization.

Whatever the philosophical virtues of the two sides of
the argument may be, it appears that the position of Carr and

Hayward is closer to reality.

Citizenship in our society does
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seem to be bound up with useful
work.
However, this v/ieu of citizenship
is entirely neutral
as to whether the state
should support the schoiar
or the

school.

While Friedman's uieu of citizenship
may not be
accurate, this fact does not upset
his position

that the state

is justified in subsidizing
but not managing the education of

its citizens.

Carr and Hayuard*s second objection
concerns the

possibility that the use of vouchers as
recommended by Friedman may produce greater racial segregation
than uould otherwise occur. As the price of good education goes
up due to

market pressures, the poor will be forced to attend
less

expensive schools.

Since, in urban areas, the poor are often

members of racial or ethnic minority groups, it seems likely
that market forces will segregate races in the process of

segregating economic classes.
Friedman claims that inexpensive quality education
will become available to the poor.

He expects that in the

ghettoes there uill arise educational entrepreneurs who will
supply the poor with educational programs of high quality.

Competition for vouchers of the poor, Friedman expects, uill
stimulate the creation of many innovative programs.

Uhile

racial segregation may occur, this may not necessarily be
bad thing in his eye3.

a

Presumably, Friedman feels that such
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segregation is

less evil than the influence of
the state in
forcing integration on unwilling
citizens.

However, Ginzberg (1971) points out
that economic
theorists have long assumed that
entrepreneurial skills are
fairly rare.
If this is so, it is not
reasonable to expect
a large number of new educational
enterprises to spring up
anywhere.
(Ginzberg does not name the theorists to whom
he
refers.
Presumably they do not include Friedman.)

Levin (i960), who argues for a controlled market,

makes the most telling points in this argument.

He notes

that sellers of high quality education are not likely
to

come to ghettoes.

If education follows the marketing pattern

of other goods and services,

pay more and get less.

he expects that the poor will

Taking retail department stores as

an example, Levin notes that those of high and middle quality

will not be found in ghetto areas.
He further argues that it is unreasonable to expect

any services suddenly to spring up, whatever the quality.

Prince Edward County, Virginia, in an effort to avoid racial

integration ordered by the Supreme Court in 1954, closed all
its schools and instituted a voucher plan.

Although services

sprang up for the benefit of whites, no educational services
at all developed for the benefit of blacks.

Barred from the

white "private" schools, blacks simply went without education
until the Supreme Court found the voucher plan unconstitutional.

40

Levin also argues that the
provision Friedman makes
for private supplements to
voucher payments uould quickly
bid services auay from the
poor.
This is a result which
Friedman seems happy to live with,
since he is convinced that
alternative and cheaper services will
develop in poor districts
But Levin points out that there
is no evidence to suggest
that such services uould arise, and
there is some reason to
suppose that they will not. He feels
that the negative aspects
of Friedman's plan will materialize
quite rapidly, while the
positive results may never occur at all.
In his extensive criticism of Friedman,

still more arguments to bear.

Levin brings

He notes that capital expenses

in ghetto areas are higher than in more prosperous
suburbs.

As a result, a larger proportion of a ghetto voucher will
be

spent on capital costs,

A

smaller proportion will be spent

on operating costs than uould be the case in a suburb.

In this

uay, not only uill the poor have feuer dollars to spend, but

their dollars uill be less effective on a cost basis than
those of their uealthier neighbors.
Further, if

a

poor family could manage to send its

child to an expensive school, Levin uonders hou they uill get
him there,

Friedman feels that payment of transportation

costs to and from school is not a proper function of government,

While the cost of school transportation uill not make
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a

particularly large dent in

a

middle claea family's budget,

it is likely to amount to a
sizeable proportion of a poor

family*3 budget.
Levin argues that the poor, ordinarily
less sophis-

ticated in educational matters than
their wealthier neighbors,
may have difficulty making proper
educational decisions.
Friedman has suggested that the poor choose
by emulating the
rich, whose tastes in other matters often
become fashion.
Levin argues that the poor have no resources
with which to

emulate the excellent tastes of the rich.
Finally, Levin notes an interesting application of the

law of diminishing returns.

Friedman claims that an advan-

tage of his proposal is the feature which allows families to

supplement their voucher allowance with private funds.

Levin

argues that upper and middle class children already have an

enormous educational advantage over the poor when they come
to school.

Since their home life is consistent with and con-

ducive to high educational achievement, upper and middle
class children are likely to receive relatively small gains
from the investment of additional funds.
However, the poor operate at distinct educational dis-

advantages.

They come to school behind their wealthier con-

temporaries in educational achievement because, as Coleman
(1967) notes, poor homes seem to lack some properties which
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are conducive to educational
attainment.

In addition,

poor

children end up further behind
their wealthier neighbors at
the end of their school careers.
This fact
has been blamed

on the schools.

Levin argues that it is more
reasonable to
expect that investment in ghetto
areas can produce more benefit per dollar than can investment
in wealthy suburbs.
As
social policy, he says, it makes little
sense to use a plan
which will plow dollars into areas where
they are least needed
Levin *s arguments strongly suggest that
some form of

regulation is required in a proposed educational
marketplace.
Nevertheless, his arguments do not refute Friedman’s
central
claim that government management of schools is
unjustified.
Indeed, Levin agrees with Friedman that competition can
effect

needed changes in the operation of public schools.

Both

Friedman and Levin expect that schools forced to compete for
vouchers of prospective students will lose the sloth character
istic of monopolies and will begin to innovate and to change

faster in more experimental directions than is currently the
case.
On the other hand, it appears that Levin’s strong

reservations concerning an unregulated market must stand.
Given the marketing pattern of other goods and services, it
does not seem likely that educational services of high quality
will come to ghettoes.

It seems probable that the poor will

get the choice of the worst buildings and the worst teachers.
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This becomes particularly likely
if it is possible for
families to supplement voucher payments
with private funds.

Given Levin's arguments, it is reasonable
to suppose
that our current problem of educational
inequality will be

greatly exacerbated by

a

program of unregulated competition

of the type proposed by Friedman.

The rich and well-to-do

will have more money to spend on increasingly
good schools
while the poor will have less money to spend on
the poorest

schools.

Further, the dollars spent by the poor can be spent

less effectively than those of the rich because of
higher

capital costs

in

the areas in which they live.

The Friedman Proposal is not designed as a plan for

social action*

In the antistatist,

laissez-faire tradition

of Will and Smith, Friedman was casting about for a way to

remove the influence of government from the education of the

citizenry.

While acceptance of the Friedman Proposal would

insure that the American educational system could not develop
into a repressive arm of the state on the Soviet model, it

also offers little hope that free market pressures will aid
in equalizing the benefits derived from the educational system
by different economic, racial, and ethnic groups.

It appears

that the latter is a more clear and present danger than the

former
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Section

3

The CSPP Proposal

Despits flaws in the Friedman
Proposal, the idea that
competition can become a major
creative force in American
education continues to find support.
The CSPP Proposal represents the most extensive attempt
so far to keep the positive
aspects of the Friedman plan uhile
minimizing or reversing
its expected negative effects.
In 1969,

the Office of Economic Opportunity
requested

that the Center for the Study of Public
Policy conduct

study of current voucher alternatives.

Vouchers

:

a

Titled "Education

Financing Education by Grants to Parents"
(1970),

the report uas only marginally an examination
of alternative

proposals.

The main thrust of the report ua 3 a discussion of

CSPP conclusions as to the most effective means of
organizing

voucher programs and a statement of conditions under uhich it
would be best to develop pilot projects deserving of 0E0 support.

Several large appendices to the report discussed legal

problems relating to the possibility that education voucher
programs may result in violations of the First and Fourteenth

Amendments.

A

discussion of these issues will be found below

in the next Section.

Chief architect of the
a

report was Christopher Jencks,

professor at Harvard University.

3encks* first written com-

ments on education vouchers, written in 1966, contained the
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often quoted comment that "if the
public schools cannot survive in open competition with
private ones, then perhaps they
should not survive (p.27). H
Teacher organizations have taken such
comments as
direct affront. The most vociferous
criticisms

a

of the CSPP

Proposal have come from the American
Federation of Teachers
and from the National Education
Association.
Teachers have
not been alone in attacking voucher
plans.
Concern over the
plan's impact on the First Amendment separation
of church and

state has prompted objections from the Anti-Defamation
League
of the B'nai B'rith.

Prospects of Fourteenth Amendment vio-

lations have drawn criticisms from the American Civil Liberties Union and from the National Association for the Advance-

ment of Colored People.

An opinion poll published in the

National Elementary Principal (1971) indicates that 43$ of
the principals polled were strongly opposed to the introduc-

tion of voucher plans into their districts.

Another 23$ felt

that such programs would divert public funds from their schools.
Only 15$ thought the plan a good one, while 19$ had no opinion.

There are three reasons for selecting the CSPP plan
for study above others.

First, it offers

a

much different

rationale and emphasis from the earlier Friedman Proposal.
It represents the latest statement in the radical interven-

tionist tradition of Thomas Paine.
Second, the CSPP plan is the most sophisticated of
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of current proposals.

Many of its provisions foresee poten-

tial problems and offer solutions to them
before they occur.

Finally, this is the proposal which most
resembles the

voucher plan currently being tested in Alum Rock,
California.
It is the only proposal upon which a
working model has been

based
The CSPP Proposal is referred to by its authors as the

Regulated Compensatory Model.

It is regulated by a local or

regional governing agency called an Education Voucher Authority (EVA), which places controls on the marketplace through
the redemption of vouchers for cash.

Schools which fail to

meet the EVA’s standards cannot cash their vouchers.

The

model is called '’compensatory" because children from poor families receive vouchers of greater value than children from

wealthier families receive.
The EVA has the responsibilities of informing parents
of their educational options, policing the voucher operation,

and managing the smooth functioning of the entire system.

In

accordance with Friedman’s earlier principle, the governing
agency handles the subsidization of students but does not par-

ticipate in the management of schools.
The EVA redeems vouchers according to the following

guidelines.
l)

Schools must not discriminate in any way against
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racial or ethnic minority group
members uho apply to schools
for admission,
If a school receives
fewer applicants than
the total number of places it
has available, the school
must
admit all uho apply.
If a school receives more
applicants than the number

of places it has available,

it may admit up to half through

any means it likes, provided that
discrimination does not
occur.
A school is considered not
to discriminate if the

racial and ethnic character of the
students accepted is proportional to the racial and ethnic composition of
the students

applying.

Applicants not chosen by the first method are selected
by lottery.

In this uay,

every child has an approximately

equal chance of being admitted to the school of his first

choice.
2)

Schools must charge tuition at

than the amount of the smallest voucher.

a

rate not higher
This condition eli-

minates the possibility of private supplements to public
vouchers which many critics feel makes the Friedman plan un-

acceptable.

Obviously, this condition is designed to make

the admission of economically disadvantaged students more

attractive to schools.

Schools can increase their income by

accepting economically disadvantaged children.
3)

Schools must have uniform expulsion codes approved

by the EVA.

This condition

will prevent the practice, openly
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feared by Jencks, of schools
admitting poor students for the
value of their voucher and then
expelling them on thin or

vague charges.

These three regulations are designed
to insure the
following. First, every student will
have an equal chance of
entering the school of his choice. Second,
lack of money will
not deprive students of a good education.
Third, once he has
been admitted by a school, each student has
the same chance
to stay in.
The CSPP report strongly characterizes public
education
as a monopoly.

It notes that there are three arguments gen-

erally used to justify the existence of

a

monopoly.

The

first defense of monopolies is that competition is technolog-

ically inefficient.

Such an argument might be used by a tele-

phone monopoly, if such

a

monopoly existed.

The second def-

ense is that consumers are not competent to make intelligent

decisions concerning a particular type of product or service.
The third defense

is that competition will cause consumers

to maximize their private advantages in ways inimical to the

general welfare.

In Friedman*s terms,

the last argument states

that competition may produce untoward neighborhood effects.
In support of its own program,

the CSPP report attacks each

of these arguments.
In answer to the first argument,

such

a

CSPP points out that

position may have had application to education at

a
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time uhen the nation was
chiefly rural.
If . community can
support only one school, then
competition will produce only

needless duplication.

However, the density of modern
urban
areas does make competition
technologically efficient. In
addition, competition may serve to
remove the inefficiencies
which overcrowding has produced
in the public schools.
The second defense of monopoly
questions the ability
of consumers to make intelligent
decisions.

CSPP points out

that government support of a particular
product makes sense
only if the government is less likely to
make errors of judgement than is the individual consumer.

Presumably the govern-

ment can afford to pay for the opinions of experts
and the

average citizen cannot.
For example, the drug industry sells products which
the average consumer is not competent to judge.

The govern-

ment hires experts who see to it that consumers have only
safe drugs to choose from.
be different.

prescribe

a

In education the case appears to

There is no body of expert opinion which can

particular educational program for

a

particular

child.
Of course,

the government may see to it that certain

minimum standards of education are met by each school.

Par-

ents would then have a list of approved schools to choose

from.
a

This procedure will insure that when a parent selects

school, he can have confidence that his school will meet
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g.ven set of standards, in the
sa me uay in uhich he has
confidence in the drugs and meats
he seiects.
This is precisely the purpose uhich an EVA
can fulfill. So far the
argument from parental incompetence
has established only that
the market needs regulation,
and the CSPP Proposal is ready
to concede that point uithout
argument.
a

Uhat if there uere educational
experts uho could prescribe a particular type of educational
program for any given
child in the same uay in uhich a
physician prescribes medicine?
Uould this fact argue against a regulated
voucher plan? If
the ansuer to the second question is Yes,
then uhy is the

drug industry not a state monopoly?
The tuo cases are parallel.
a

A

set of experts makes

prescription for treatment of a given kind to

a

layman.

The layman then fills the prescription on the open market.
No matter hou incompetent he may be, his choice is certain
to

meet standards established by government for the consumer*s
own benefit.

While he might be able to make

a

better choice,

he cannot make a bad one.

But if he could make a better choice, shouldn*t the

decision be taken out of his hands and given to someone uho
could make a better choice?

This question sounds reasonable,

but it suggests something antithetic to the notion of a free

society.

Suppose

a

man uishes to buy the most economical car
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Of a given size.

Instead, he is persuaded to buy
the car
which looks the shiniest, and this
car is not as economical
as others he might have chosen.
This individual could have
made a better choice and may uell
regret his selection for
years to come.
The suggestion in the question at the
beginning of the

proceeding paragraph is that the right to select
his own cars
should be removed from our incompetent friend

and handed over

to an agency of the state.

Clearly, this is not the way in

which our society would go about solving such

a

problem.

Multiply our example by hundreds of thousands and assume
that the inability to select economical cars constitutes

national problem.

a

Such circumstances can be used to justify

government regulation of the marketplace.

The government

might require car salesmen to post certain data in
uous place in their showrooms.

a

conspic-

Alternatively, the government

might make such information available to anyone who requested
it.

No doubt there are many other ways in which the state

could intervene to aid consumers in making good decisions.
One thing the state would not do is simply assign consumers
to cars in an attempt to prevent poor decisions from being

made.
The case just presented is perfectly parallel in

every logically relevant respect to the case of education.
Of course,

education seems more important than cars and the
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defender of the public monopoly
might uish to shift his
ground from the logical to the
pragmatic. Even so. there are
many equally important decisions
in uhich the state does not
directly take a hand. One's
choice of career, selection of
one's spouse, decisions concerning
uhere to live
and hou

many children to have, if any,
are unquestionably very important. Many people make these
decisions very poorly, yet the

institution of state control in these cases
uould contradict
the notion of a free society.
The government does not interfere in many
important

decisions of its citizens.

This fact appears to reflect an

assumption that people have the right to make

a wide

variety

of decisions concerning their lives and the
lives of their

children.

Further, ue do not seem to feel that people lose

that right because they make their choices badly.

Those uho

argue in favor of state monopoly in education uish to exempt

education from this general assumption.

siderations

The proceeding con-

indicate that there are no particular reasons

for granting such an exemption to public schools.
The third argument in favor of maintaining an educ-

ational monopoly is that the maximizing of benefits for some

individuals uill adversely affect the public good.
report accepts this argument.

The CSPP

It agrees that an unregulated

free market is uorse than no voucher plan at all.

The report
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states that this argument
is one of the reasons the
CSPP felt
that the creation of an EVA
was necessary.
The EVA is designed to prevent the seeking
of private advantages from becoming public problems. Put
another way, this third argument
is more properly directed
against the Friedman Proposal.
The rationale for unequal vouchers
weighted in favor
of the poor uas first presented
by Oencks (1966).

He claimed

that tuice as much money is spent
on the education of white
suburban children as is spent on the education
of poor, urban,

minority children.

He arrived at that conclusion through the

following considerations.
The dollar amounts spent on education for each child
in the suburbs are roughly one and one-half times
greater than

the amounts spent for each child in the inner cities.

Because

of conditions in neighborhoods and families suitable to educ-

ational success, middle class children tend to stay in school
longer than poor children.

According to Oencks, the average

school career in the suburbs is between sixteen and seventeen
years.

In the inner cities,

the average length of education

is between nine and ten years.

The middle and upper classes

spend more money per year per child for a greater number of

years than do the poor.
spent on the education of

Jencks estimates that about $5000 is
a

poor child while about $10,000 is

spent on the education of a wealthier child.
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Now, if wealthy districts and
poor districts each div-

ide up their available educational
funds and distribute the

resulting quotients among their respective
students, it is
clear that poor children will continue to
have less money spent
on their educations than do wealthier
children.
One solution
to this problem might be to have EVA's
direct the affairs
of

voucher programs in several districts, taking care
that the
districts in each Authority's jurisdiction represented

many

different economic levels.

Such an approach has political

drawbacks, since wealthy districts will not easily permit the
value of their vouchers to decrease through dilution in poor

ditricts •
Another solution, recommended by the authors of the
CSPP report, involves direct Federal subsidies to poor districts.
To the extent that money is a solution to problems of education-

al inequality, this proposal will tend to level poorer districts

upwards.

3encks recommends that the requirements for eligib-

ility for subsidies be liberal enough for at least half the

population to receive them.

He hopes in this way to induce a

large portion of the population to believe that they are re-

ceiving direct benefits from voucher participation.

A

number

of commentaries suggest a sliding scale adjusted heavily in

favor of low-income families.

(See "Issues of Grants and Loans

..." (1971), Krebs and Stevens (1971), and Pollev and others

(1970) ).
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Section 4

Criticisms of the CSPP Proposal
One of the virtues of the CSPP report
is the fact

that it anticipates and attempts to
answer possible objections
to its voucher plan.
In the previous section, three
arguments

traditionally used to justify the existence
of monopolies
were discussed.
The refutation of those arguments may be
said
to constitute a justification of the
CSPP Proposal.
Having

justified the plan, ue nou examine less fundamental
objections
with a vieu to discovering hou the authors of the plan
defend
it.

Shanker (1971), president of the American Federation
of Teachers, states in a highly strident article his opinion

that voucher experiments uill be "irreversible."

He fears

that once pilot projects begin, there uill be no uay to end
the experiment, even if unsuccessful.

Houever, the Alum

Rock project made definite plans to terminate at the end of
its first year of operation and presumably uould have done so
if support for its continuation uas not forthcoming from par-

ents and teachers.

If the community had not uished to con-

tinue the experiment, the project*s directors intended to end
it.

Since the project uas able to make reasonable plans for

this contingency, it is difficult to accept Shanker*s claim

that they could not have carried out their plan, even if the
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community had wanted them to do
so.
Another union official, David Selden,
urged the House
Committee on Education and Labor to
curtail funding for

voucher experiments before they had
begun.

Like Shanker,

he feared that even the smallest
experiment would grow like

"cancer.”

The committee noted that it was
unusual for educ-

ators to want to call off any experiments
before results could
be evaluated and refused to do so.
(See Beckler
(1971).

A

chief fear of the AFT and of the NEA is that
public

schools will become the schools of last resort.

They fear that

parents will flock to new alternatives, private schools,
and

parochial schools.

As a result, they say, public schools will

receive only those students who fail to be admitted to schools
of their choice or students who are so uneducable that no one

else will take them.

These organizations feel that educational funds are so

precious that they ought not to be squandered on what may be
just another educational fad.

They would prefer to see funds

used to improve school facilities, materials, and teachers*

salaries.
It is difficult to assess these dire predictions.

One

feels that they are not so much arguments as fears expressed
in the form of arguments.

influence wane.

Clearly, no union wants to see its

That is understandable.

If one has faith that

in the long run families will tend to select those schools
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urhich are doing the best job,

then those public schools uhich

are performing adequately ought
to have nothing to fear.
Uhat is true of the unions is not
necessarily true of
the teachers.
The Alum Rock project continues to
operate only
because it has the support of local teachers
and parents.

Because this decision appears to have been
motivated by factors
quite different from the ones under consideration
here, a

discussion of its significance uill be deferred to
Chapter

V.

Other concerns have been raised concerning the CSPP

Proposal and ue uill nou turn to these.

CSPP notes that the

Anti-Defamation League of the B*nai B*rith is concerned that
voucher programs uill lead to the abandonment of the principle
of separation of church and state should parochial schools be

permitted to cash vouchers.

The First Amendment prohibits

Congress from adoption of any measure uhich may lead to the

institution of a state religion.

It is not clear uhether this

prohibition entails further prohibitions against parochial
school participation in voucher programs.
Voucher proponents point out that no voucher program
uould involve giving public funds to parochial schools for
the purpose of religious instruction.

Voucher funds are given

to private individuals uho may spend them on any educational

program that appeals to them.
Four Supreme Court cases are cited by those favoring
the institution of voucher plans on the CSPP model.

In
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Bra dfield v. Roberts the
Court ruled that the Federal
government may make grants for the
purpose of building construction
for a hospital sponsored by a
religious organization. Houever,
the hospital uas funded by an
act of Congress, and the legal
principles involved are too narrou for
application to vouchers.
In
1 Ck Bear u ‘ Leu
P G thB Coutt ruled that the government may

—

|

.

make payment of costs to a Catholic school
on an Indian reservation
Again, the principle developed is too narrou
for application to
voucher programs since the Court uas concerned
uith possible

violations of

a

Sioux treaty and not uith church-state issues.

Everson v. Boar d of Education provided that states may
make available transportation to and from parochial schools.

Allen v. Board

of

Education provided that public education agencies

may make their textbooks available to parochial schools.
Three recent decisions indicate that the courts may be

changing their minds on these matters.

Ualz v. Tax Commission

ruled that government agencies must avoid all "excessive entangle-

ments" uhich might aid in favoring any or even all religions.
In Protestants and Other Americans United v. United States the

Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the lending of public
library facilities to parochial schools in fact runs afoul of
the "excessive entanglement" stipulation developed in Ualz

The barrier against any form of public aid to parochial schools
uas raised even higher by the Supreme Court decision in Lemon v .

Kurtzman

In that case,

the judges overturned tuo laus

:

a

Rhode
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Island statute permitting the
state to supplement parochial
school teachers' salaries up to
ISJC, and a Pennsylvania
lau
uhich allowed the state to
reimburse private and parochial
schools for salaries, textbooks, and
other materials in some
secular subjects. The Court declared
that such laws caused

impermissible entanglements of church and
state affairs.
The Lemon decision is a major
landmark in the develop-

ment of the Court's vieu on the subject
of state aid to nonpublic education.
Its effect on voucher programs and
plans
has been enormous.

In Alum Rock,

site of the only existing

pilot project at the time of this writing,
administrators
have dropped all plans to include parochial schools
in the

voucher project.

The governor of New Jersey, who favored

state aid to parochial schools, vetoed

action through

a

voucher program.

a bill

approving such

He felt that it was foolish

to attempt to implement a program in violation of the Court's

constitutional interpretations.

A

number of other states

refused to implement voucher plans following the Lemon decision.
It is not at all clear how much of this action has been

rational.

It is by no means certain that when a family spends

a voucher at a parochial school,

of church and state.

Is a

the result is an entanglement

voucher public money uhich local

agencies grant to parents, or is it private money uhich the
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local agency returns tc
parents?

The ansuer is net simple.

Examination cf a similar case
leads us to the conclusion that
current reaction to the Lemon
decision may be premature. Veterans receiving funds under the
GI Bill can spend these funds
at any educational institution
of their choice.
Such funds
are regularly spent at secular and
parochial, public and
private colleges and universities. To
the extent that voucher
payments offer an analog to payments under
the
GI Bill,

it

ought to be permissible to spend them at
any institution of
one’s choice.
Is

the analogy valid?

The ansuer to this question

rests largely on uhat the Supreme Court uill say.

To this

date, the Court has not been asked the appropriate
question.
If the Court feels that voucher payments become private
funds

uhen a citizen receives them, it might rule that payment of
such funds to parochial schools is permissible.

If the Court

feels that such funds remain public even uhen in the hands of

private citizens, it uill make the opposite ruling.

Until a

case involving actual voucher payments to parochial schools
is brought before the Court,

any decision that such action is

unconstitutional must be deemed premature.
Should it happen that the Court rules that support of

students uho uish to attend parochial schools involves "excessive entanglement," this ruling uould limit the choices

available to some families uithout damaging the central prin-
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ciplBs Of voucher programs.

Kornegay (I960), in an article

critical of voucher plana, points out
that parochial schools
may not represent any improvement over
public schools.
If
that is so, then limiting the range
of choice to exclude parochial schools ought not to affect the basic
benefits which

proponents of the plan have claimed for it*
The CSPP report notes that both the ACLU and
the NAACP

both have strong reservations concerning the
legality of

voucher programs.
serve

Both organizations feel that such programs

or may serve to promote racial segregation through

the use of public funds.

In fact,

the very first voucher

programs were begun in Southern states in an effort to cir-

cumvent the 1954 desegregation ruling of the Supreme Court.
The program developed in Prince Eduard County, Virginia has

been mentioned briefly in this regard (see p. 39).

According to the CSPP report, the Supreme Court has
ruled that vouchers whose purpose is to aid any school organized for the purpose of excluding children on the basis of

race are unconstitutional.

This ruling was made in direct

response to voucher plans like the one in Prince Eduard
County.
In addition,

the CSPP feels that any voucher program

whose probable or actual effect is to aid schools organized
for purposes of racial segregation is probably unconstitutional.
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Although the program itself may not be
designed to create or
to maintain segregated educational
facilities, if

these results

are in fact obtained it seems likely that the
Court uill find

against the v/oucher program.
CSPP points out that the regulatory function of the
E\/A

is designed to avoid just such occurences.

The EVA can

refuse to support any school by refusing to cash its vouchers
if the agency can present reasons for believing that the school

has practiced racial discrimination in the selection of its

students.
The possibility of discrimination does not arise un-

less a school or program has received more applicants than it
can reasonably provide for.

Unless such oversubscription

occurs, the school must admit anyone uho applies or lose its
EVA support.

Uhen oversubscription does occur, schools must admit
at least half their students by lottery.

Presumably the laus

of probability uill insure that the racial and ethnic compos-

ition of the group admitted uill be proportional to the racial
and ethnic composition of the group applying.

Students not selected by lottery must be selected in

proportion to the racial and ethnic makeup of the group of
applicants, although schools may use any other criteria they
like for this group.

(It is not clear in the report

uhether

this group is to be chosen in proportion to the composition
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of the remaining group or of
the original group.)
In case economic segregation
should coincide with

intended or apparent racial segregation,
all schools must
charge tuition at a rate not greater
than the amount of the
smallest voucher.

This provision is intended to insure
that

every student has the ability to pay the
cost of his education.

Given these conditions, it appears that
racial dis-

crimination will be very hard to achieve in

a

regulated voucher

plan unless nearly all the participants want to
segregate them-

selves.

If members of different racial groups choose
to

attend separate schools, racial segregation will occur.

It

is not clear that such conditions would violate the Fourteenth

Amendment or the 1954 desegregation decision.
These considerations appear to weigh heavily in favor
of the CSPP Proposal.

Vouchers appear to offer equal educ-

ational opportunity to members of each racial group.

At the

same time it is doubtful that they will lead to a breakdown
of the separation of church and state.

Even if the Supreme

Court rules to the contrary, this will not necessarily be

major blow to voucher proponents.

a

The CSPP Proposal seems

able to deal with the objections we have examined.
There are reasons to believe that education vouchers
can achieve the goals claimed for them.

constitute a guarantee.

These reasons do not

The remainder of this paper will ex-

amine the Alum Rock pilot project to determine to what extent,
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if any,

the realities of educational
practice are bearing out

the expectations of educational
theory.

Section

5

Summary
The material in this Chapter is sufficiently
varied to

warrant the inclusion of

a

summary.

Friedman has argued that the state is justified in subsidizing general education for citizenship but not in managing
it.

Against this position Lutz and Megel and Bhaerman have

disputed the benefits of the competition which will result from

withdrawal of state support for the public schools.

Ue have

seen that their arguments have not been borne out by the history
of free markets.

Ginzberg's objection that Friedman's plan will not decrease

inequalities among rich and poor school districts is valid, but
is also academic in light of the fact that the Supreme Court

has ruled that such inequalities are permissible.

Carr and Hayward have two objections to Friedman's plan.
They dispute the distinction between general education for cit-

izenship and vocational or professional education.

They also

claim that Friedman vouchers will tend to augment racial seg-

regation •
Their first objection appears to be valid.

However, the

view that no proper distinction can be drawn between the two
types of education is completely consistent with the view that
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governments should subsidize but not manage
education.
Their second objection seems stronger.

Friedman's plan

seems capable of creating economic segregation
which may be the
same as creating racial segregation, at least in
many urban

areas

Friedman's claim that inexpensive quality education will
become available in ghettoes is disputed by Ginzberg.

If valid,

Ginzberg's claim and Carr and Hayward's second claim constitute
a

strong objection to the advisability of implementing the

Friedman Proposal.
The most telling points in this debate are made by Levin,

who rejects Friedman vouchers in favor of a controlled market-

place.

He notes that the marketing procedures

and patterns

of other goods and services have not brought quality products

to the ghettoes.

He doubts that education of any quality will

suddenly spring up and notes the experience of Prince Edward
County,

\J

irginia as

a

precedent.

Uhile these hoped-for positive results of Friedman's plan
will be

a

long time developing, Levin argues that the expected

negative results would develop rapidly.

He expects, as does

Friedman, that educational services will be bid away from the
poor

Levin also argues that capital expenditure in ghettoes
will be more effective, since the outcome per dollar spent

should be greater ,

Difficulties with transportation costs and with
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UUh

d6CiSi0n makin9

b*

*». unsophisticated poor
are still other

problems
Levin's arguments strongly
suggest that an unregulated
educational marketplace can create
great disadvantages for those
uho can bear them least well.

position

-

However, the essence of Friedman's

that the government has no
business in the management
of the education of its citizens
can survive intact in a regulated educational marketplace. At
the same time, the harsh
edges of Friedman's laissez -faire doctrine
can be blunted.

-

The C5PP Proposal is an attempt to build
a model of such
a

regulated plan.

Characterising public education as a monopoly,

the authors of the report ask if this monopoly
can be justified
by any of the three arguments used to justify
the existence of

monopolies in other fields.
The first argument is that the monopoly is technologically

inefficient.

Uhile this may have been true of rural communities

which could only support one school, the authors reject its

application to tightly packed urban areas where it may well be
more effective to have many schools competing in

a given area.

The second defense of monopoly questions the ability of

consumers to make intelligent decisions*

In expanding the position

given by the CSPP, we have noted that the inability of consumers
to make intelligent decisions is an argument for regulation and

inspection but not for state monopoly.

The drug industry was

presented as an analog which is regulated but not monopolized.
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On further examination,

ue find that the notion that

person loses his right to decide an
important question for
himself because he lacks, or even ignores,
expert opinion is
antithetical to principles of a free society.
People may often
choose their houses, their cars, occupations,
and spouses
a

badly,

yet they are not assigned houses, cars,
occupations, and spouses
in the way in uhich they are assigned to
public schools.

The conclusion of this discussion uas that education

should be maintained as

a

state monopoly only if there is some

compelling feature uhich distinguishes it from the cases described.
There does not appear to be any such feature and therefore no

reason for granting an exemption from the rigors of competition
to public education.

The third argument in favor of maintaining

a

monopoly is

that the attempt by some individuals to maximize benefits for

themselves uill adversely affect the public good.

The CSPP

report accepts this argument, but claims that it tends to support not monopoly but regulation.

On this basis, the argument

is more properly directed against the Friedman Proposal.

Other, less fundamental, objections uere examined.

Shanker claimed that voucher experiments are irreversible and
that once an experiment begins, there uill be no uay to prevent
its spread, even if, as he believes, the experiment is unsuccessful.

This argument is rejected more or less out of hand.

Other union

officials have claimed that vouchers uill cause funds to flou
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auay from the public schools.

Houever, it seems clear that if

public schools are performing well,
there ought to be no fear
for their future under competition.
On the other hand, if they
aren't doing well, competition may be of
some benefit to the
clients , if not to the schools*
The question as to whether voucher programs
which include

parochial schools run afoul of the First Amendment
was discussed.
A number of court decisions were
presented to illustrate
both

sides of the question.

A

judgement on this issue must be held

in abeyance since the various decisions can be
explained on

principles too narrow to be of use in

a

discussion of vouchers.

The critical question seems to be whether voucher funds

when they pass from parents to schools are public monies or

private.

An analogy is drawn to the use of funds made under the

GI Bill where they are treated as private funds and can be used
in financing parochial education.

No doubt other analogies could

be drawn to indicate that the funds are still public.

Until

there is a more definite ruling in the courts on this matter,
the issue cannot be settled on a reasonable basis.
A

final issue is the use of vouchers for furthering racial

segregation in schools.

An examination of the elements of the

CSPP Proposal designed to eliminate such possibilities indicated
thay they are adequate to their task.

Having summarized the discussion in this Chapter, we

turn to an examination of the field study and its findings.
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CHAPTER

III

METHODOLOGY OF THE FIELD STUDY
The objectives of the field
study are the foliouing:

comparison of operational and administrative
procedures employed by the pilot project
uith project specifications presented by CSPP to the 0E0 at the
beginning
1.

A

of the

project’s planning stage,
2. Through interviews,

an examination of attitudes of

project participants to determine in what way the
theoretical
issues discussed in Chapters

I

and II have been translated

to the realities of the pilot project,
3. An assessment of the status of the foliouing issues;

a.

Have families demonstrated a capacity to make

educational choices on a rational basis?
b.

Has the existence of competition created greater

diversity in the schools?
c.

Have the roles of teachers and principals been

changed as a result of participation in the pilot project
and if so, hou?

Fulfillment of these objectives will be met in the

following ways,
Objective

(The objectives are repeated for convenience,)
1,

A

comparison of operational and administ-

rative procedures employed by the pilot project uith project

specifications presented by CSPP to the 0E0 at the beginning

70

of the project's planning stage.

Procedure: The project director will be interviewed
and will be questioned concerning the comparison.

presented twelve specifications.

The CSPP

Each one will form the basis

of a question or series of questions until a
determination

can be made as to the project's fulfillment of that specific-

ation*

(The twelve

specifications with accompanying rationale

are printed below for reference.)
1 •

The pilot project should remain in operation for

five to eight years before expanding the program.

Rationale: The project should not be expanded if there
are any major flaws in it.

A

complete evaluation which can

include assessments of the project's impact upon development
of equal educational opportunity cannot be prepared on an

accurate basis before five year's time.
2.

Before beginning the project there should be

a

year long planning period.

Rationale: Many technical difficulties are to be exThese include use and scheduling of busses, prepar-

pected.

ation of teachers, development of information services for
parents, and the like.

The project should not begin until

all such technical problems can be met.
3.

The population of the area should be heterogeneous.

Rationale: One expected effect of vouchers is an increase in integration of various racial and ethnic groups.
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If the project area contains many
such groups it will be poss-

ible to assess the impact of vouchers upon
their integration
or segregation as it develops.
4.

The area in each project should include only one

municipality.
Rationale: Political factors are likely to be strong
in any voucher experiment.

If more than one municipality is

involved , these factors may become more important than the
basic educational issues involved.

In addition,

evaluation

of each municipality *s development will become impossibly com-

plicated if both are involved in the same project.
5.

There should be local private schools willing to

participate in the program.
Rationale: One of the purposes of the experiment is to

offer many alternatives to parents in an effort to create

regulated free market.

a

If only public schools participate,

many educationally interesting choices will be lost to parents.
Uhat happens in such a foreshortened market place may not be
as significant as it might be.
6.

The program should extend through grads six, but

not above.

Rationale: For reasons of purity of experimental design,
the effects of vouchers should be evaluated for elementary

education before

a

project is begun at the secondary level.

experiment.
Once conclusions can be drawn about the initial
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it can be extended to other educational
lev/els,
7. All children of appropriate age should be
eligible

to participate in the program.

Rationale: Results may be distorted if certain segments of the school population are not permitted to
participate.
Since the objective of the experiment is to simulate free

market conditions, all eligible students must be permitted to
participate.
8.

Schools should be permitted to fill

a

limited

number of places any uay they like, but must not discriminate
in doing so.

Rationale: Aside from reasons presented in Chapter

II

(see pp. 46-7, 62), this provision also helps to equalize the

differing admission procedures of public schools, which have
none, and private schools, which are often quite selective.
The public school is given some of the autonomy of the private

school, while it in turn loses 3ome of its flexibility through
the following provision.
9.

Schools should be required to fill one-half their

places by lottery.

Rationale: This provision complements specification

8.

It also helps to insure that racial or ethnic discrimination

cannot occur.
10. There should be no arbitrary expulsions.
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Rationale: This provision prevents the
possibility that
schools Dili admit students only for the
value of their vouchers
and then expel them for spurious reasons.
11.

There should be an Education Voucher Authority

(EVA) to administer the program.

Rationale:
on pp.

The reasons for this provision are presented

46-8.
12.

EVA should collect and distribute information
about

schools as necessary.
Rationale:

This provision is designed to help parents

make rational choices among the schools and programs available.

Objective 2.

Through interviews, an examination of

attitudes of project participants to determine in what way
the theoretical issues discussed in Chapters

I

and II have been

translated by the realities of the pilot project.
Procedure:

There are tuo groups with whose theoretical

views we will be concerned.
staff of the project.

The first is the administrative

The second is the staff of the local
-

California Teachers* Association.
The first part of the interview with the administrative

staff, particularly the project director, will be taken up

with fulfillment of Objective 1.

Should it happen that the

project does not meet some specifications, the next set of

questions will deal with the significance of this fact,
set of questions will attempt to determine the director's

A

third
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vieus and the v/iews of his staff
concerning the impact of
the project on the educational enterprise
in the community.
Some of this discussion will involve
fulfillment of Objective
3

(see below).

Much of this section will consist of presenting

to interviewees objections discussed in
Chapters

I

and II and

practical arguments gathered from other project
participants.
It is assumed that the project staff will think
the project a

good one and objections will be used to determine their
reasons
for thinking so.
The second group to be interviewed in fulfillment of

Objective

2

are the appropriate members of the Mount Hamilton

(San Jose) Council of the California Teachers* Association.
It is assumed that these individuals will have reservations

concerning voucher programs.

Using the method just outlined,

we will attempt to discover what these objections are and the

basis on which they were developed.
The views of two important groups, namely school board

members and parents, will not be dealt with in these pages and
this absence should be explained.

The district administration,

both school board and superintendent, have made
to disassociate themselves from the project.

decided effort

Control was given

if it occured,

to the Sequoia Foundation so that failure,

not be laid at the district administration

a

*

s

door.

could

Since they

were not involved in the project, these individuals were not

contacted.

On the other hand, some parents were interviewed,
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but their orai responses proved
uninteresting.

The Rand Corp-

oration used written instruments to
interview parents. Since
this work was already underway, and
since the author lacked the
resources for conducting a similar survey,
reports on parents
were left out of the report. The Rand
Corporation's findings
uill be presented in Chapter IV/.
The following is a brief rationale for the
method of

conducting interviews used in this study.

If the project

actually

resembles the CSPP Proposal, we can expect that some of
the

theoretical issues discussed in Chapter

II

to have become prac-

tical issues.

If the project is quite different,

will be, too.

By examining the changes in issues, some notion

the issues

of the status of vouchers in Alum Rock can be determined

Objective 3a. Determine whether families have demonstrated
basis

a

capacity for making educational choices on

a

rational

.

Procedure: Ue will determine how many parents are sending their children to schools other than their neighborhood

school.

In addition,

we will determine how many families with

more than one child are sending their children to more than
one school.

Both these factors are indicative of the existence

of decision making but are hardly conclusive.

The opinions of

those who advise parents and the opinions of teachers and prin-

cipals will be sought to amplify the factual information.

Objective 3b.

Determine whether the existence of com-
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petition has created greater
diversity in participating
schools
Procedure:

numerical comparison of the numbers
and
types of programs existing
before and after introduction
A

of

vouchers will be made.
Objective 3c. Determine how, if at
all, the roles of
principals and teachers have changed
as a result of participation in the program.
Procedure: Principals and teachers will be
interviewed.
Teachers will be questioned concerning changes
they perceive
in their oun jobs.

Three areas will be focused upon. First,

relations with fellow teachers will be examined.

Teachers

uill be asked to comment upon effects of competition on
this

aspect of their professional life.

Second, teachers will be

asked to comment on the effect, if any, vouchers have had
upon their conduct of their classroom.

Ue uill want to find

out if they feel freer to create, or less free; if their

instructional acumen has been increased or decreased; and
if they prefer or do not prefer being part of a competitive

system.

Finally, teachers uill be asked to comment upon

their role in school affairs.

Ue will want to know if they

are taking a greater role in management of school business.

Principals will be questioned about the same aspects
of teachers* roles in order to determine if there is any dis-

parity of views between the views of the two groups.

Prin-
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cipals will be asked about changes
in their oun role as well.
Ue will want to know hou their
style of management has changed,
if at all.

changed.

Ue will uant to know whether their
functions hav/e

For example, do they spend more or
less time acting

as disciplinarians?

service supervision?

Do they spend more or less time on in-

Must they attend more administrative

meetings with their staff or are there fewer?
resulted in

great deal more paperwork?

a

Have vouchers

Finally, principals

will be asked their view of the voucher project.

Interviews will all be taperecorded and transcribed
to typescript.

Transcription will occur on the same day as

recording in order to allow re—use of a limited supply of tapes.
In discussion of Objectives

1

and

2

in the next chapter, edited

portions of interviews will be presented to illustrate points
to be made.

A

commentary, tying discussion concerning issues

examined, will be inserted into the transcript of the conver-

sations at appropriate points in discussion of Objective

2.

Interviews with principals and teachers will be sum-

marized but not reproduced.

The same is true of interviews

with any other school personnel.

Chapter IV will discuss the field study in terms of
the objectives laid down in this chapter.

comments of

a

more general nature.

Chapter

V

will make
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CHAPTER

IV

THE FIELD STUDY

The field study was conducted in August and
September
of 1973 in the Alum Rock Union School District,
San Dose, Cal-

ifornia,

At that time the experimental voucher project had

completed its first year of operation and uas preparing for
its second.

Dr, Doel Levin is the director of the project and

is the source for the following background information.

The Alum Rock district is in a lou-income area a feu

miles south and east of the central area of San Dose,

There

are some 30,000 residents in the district of uhom 18,000 are

school-aged children.

The average family in Alum Rock has

six children.
The population of the district is 50% Mexican-American,

40% white, and 10% black,

Uhile these figures would be un-

usual for most parts of the country, they are not in San Dose,

which is the second largest Mexican-American community in the
United States,
There are twenty-four schools in the district.

During

the first year of operation, 1972-3, six schools participated
in the project.

year for

a

Seven schools were added in the 1973-4 school

total of thirteen.

As a result, slightly more

than half the students in the district participated in the

project during the year following the field study.
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The operation of the voucher
program is fairly simple

and straightforward.

In March of each year,

parents are sent

information concerning the available
programs, instructions on
hou to use the sign-up forms provided,
and a description of
vouchers and their purpose. The materials sent

are all bilingual.

The material emphasizes to parents that they
may choose

any school listed and points out to parents the
fact that their

control over their childrens* education is increased by
this

procedure
Parents then proceed to review the material describing
the various programs offered.

1973—4.

There uere 42 such programs in

Since the number of programs is large enough to cause

confusion even to the most sophisticated reader, the programs
are conveniently grouped into nine categories:

Traditional,

Innovative, Gifted, Fine Arts, Learning by Doing, Individualized
Learning, Multi-Cultural, Kindergarten, Bilingual.
A

a

parent who wished to do no more could simply select

category and find the nearest school offering such

a

program.

In order to help parents become more selective than that, coun-

selors uho are themselves parents may assist parents in making
choices
Once a choice has been made,

a

parent then fills out

card indicating first, second, and third choices.
are assigned their places
a

—

a

Once squatters

squatters are students uho attended

given school during the last year, or the younger sibling of
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such a student

—

requests are filled.

If there are not enough

vacancies, schools may elect to expand
their capacity. Failing
that a lottery is held and the losers
move to their second choice.
Schools decide to enter the program through
a

their faculties.

vote of

Once a school has decided to enter the
pro-

gram, it is free to form itself into
semi-autonomous mini-schools.
The programs developed by the mini-schools are
reported to the

Educational Voucher Advisor Council
of the functions of the

El/A

(El/AC)

which performs some

described in Chapter II.

then presents the information to parents.

The EVAC

Its other functions

will be described shortly.

Uhen a student is sent to

brings with him

a

participating school, he

a

voucher whose value is added to the school's

operating budget.

In grades Kindergarten through six vouchers

were valued at $840 in 1972—3.

eight was $1,046.90.
also qualifies for

a

The value for grades seven and

If a student qualifies for free lunch,

he

compensatory voucher, and brings with him

an additional $275.
It should be noted here that these vouchers represent a

significant departure from both the Friedman and the CSPP Proposals.

In both plans, the value of a voucher was to be det-

ermined by distributing to each family

amount needed to educate the community.

a

certain share of the
The fund which is div-

ided to produce vouchers in Alum Rock comes from a grant of the

federal government.
Uhen a school decides to enter the voucher experiment,
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it is electing to receive additional funds
from the federal

government in the form of education vouchers.

This fact re-

presents a crucial difference between voucher models and
the
realities of voucher operation.

A

discussion of the distor-

tions produced by this means of financing is found in the
next chapter.
This difference is not the only one between the CSPP

specifications and actual voucher operations.

The first

objective of the field study is a determination of these

differences.

During the discussion, objectives will be re-

peated for convenience.

Objective 1.

A

comparison of operational and admin-

istrative procedures employed by the pilot project with project specifications presented by CSPP to the 0E0 at the be-

ginning of the project’s planning stage.
The twelve specifications are repeated and are followed
by appropriate comments.

Joel Levin is again the source for

this information.
1. The pilot project should remain in operation for

five to eight years before expanding the program.
The project has expanded its operation within the

host district and plans to continue its expansion to include
all schools in the district.

pansion on two grounds.

Dr. Levin justifies this ex-

First, the intention of this spec-

ification was the prevention of exportation of the project to
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other districts before it has been completely
evaluated.

The

current expansion is taking place entirely within
the initial
district. Second, this expansion is consistent with
specification

which requires all children in the district to be

7

eligible for participation in the project.
2.

Before beginning the project there should be

a

year long planning period.
The required planning was performed.

Details of oper-

ation and the responsibilities of the EVAC were planned.

The

program was explained to school faculties who then determined
whether or not they wished to participate.

Schools which de-

cided to participate planned their mini-school operations and

planned their budgets around the increased incomes provided
by vouchers.
3.

The population of the area should be heterogeneous.

There are three racial and ethnic groups heavily rep-

resented in Alum Rock.

The figures on page 65 do not include

small numbers of Orientals and Phillippinos .

The district

appears to meet the CSPP standards of racial and ethnic heterogeneity.
From the standpoint of economic heterogeneity, the

district is less qualified.

The area is uniformly low-income.

Literally no middle class housing exists in the area.
other hand, it is far from being

a

ghetto.

On the

Practically the
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entire working population consists
of unskilled laborers.
Or. Levin's records indicate
that none of the teachers

in

the district resides there.
In an economically heterogeneous
community it would

be possible to discover if the use of
education vouchers has
any affect upon educational equality.
The Alum Rock project

uill not lead to such discoveries.

The fact that vouchers are

being used in a low-income area has had

a

great deal to do

with the attitudes of participants towards the project.

This

matter uill be discussed in detail in following sections.
4.

The area in each project should include only one

municipality.
Of course, the project includes less than one municipal-

ity*

However, it is not unusual in California for a community

to have more than one school district.

This is particularly

true in areas near secondary urban centers.

purposes, Alum Rock is a community.

For educational

The project in fact

includes only one such community.
5.

There should be local private schools willing to

participate in the program.
There is at least one private school willing to par-

ticipate in the program.

It has not been permitted to do so.

The local chapter of the California Teachers* Association has

indicated that it uill withdraw its support from the program
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if any non-public schools are given
voucher funds.

Dr. Levin

is convinced that the project cannot
survive without support

of the local union.

As a result, there are no private schools

participating in the program and no prospects that any will
be permitted to do so.
Of course, this is a strong divergence from the ori-

ginal design of the CSPP Proposal.

Every voucher proposal

made to date has assumed that public schools will be in com-

petition with private ones.

Failure of this specification

is the most crucial difference between the CSPP Proposal and

the actual voucher project.
6.

The program should extend through grade six, but

not above.
The project does not meet this specification.

middle school is participating.
a

One

Plans exist for including

senior high school in coming years.
7. All children of appropriate age should be eligible

to participate in theprogram.
At the beginning of the 1973-4 school year, slightly

more than half the children in Alum Rock were eligible to

participate in the program.

A

child becomes elgible when

his neighborhood school votes in favor of participation.

If

it does, the child may then be sent to any voucher school his

parents choose.

If his neighborhood school does not choose
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to participate in the program,
than the child muet continue
to attend that school.
As a result, the project does
not

meet this specification.
Schools must be permitted to fill

8.

a

limited number

of places any uay they like, but must not
discriminate in

doing so.
9. Schools are required to fill one-half their
places

by lottery.

These specifications will be considered jointly since
they are closely related.

The placement procedure in Alum

Rock is as follows.
In flay, parents make applications to the EVAC.

The

application indicates which school they wish their children
to attend, which mini-school within the school, and the number
of the mini-school.

Three choices can be made and the order

of preference indicated.
A

family is said to have squatter*s rights at the

school it attended before joining the voucher project.
child who attends that school is
his younger siblings.

a

Any

squatter and so are all

If a squatter chooses to attend the

school he is currently attending, he must be allowed to do so.

Applications are received at the EVAC*s offices and
results are tabulated.

If no school is overenrolled, then

everyone may attend his first choice school.

An announcement
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is made concerning the number of
vacancies in each program
to facilitate last minute changes.
If some schools are overenrolled,

cedure goes into effect.

the following pro-

All squatters are placed in their

current schools if they wish to be placed there,

(if a

squatter does not exercise his right, he cannot reclaim
it
later.) The number of vacancies to be filled by non-squatters
is determined.

Non-squatters are chosen randomly by grade

and program until all vacancies in a given building are filled.

Remaining applicants are placed in their second choice

program if their first choice is closed.

If the second choice

is also overenrolled , another lottery is held and losers are

placed in their third choice.
If a school is overenrolled, the foregoing procedure

can sometimes be eliminated if the faculty so choose.

They

may elect to increase the number of students they will allow
in the school.

They may go farther and choose to accept

everyone who applies to them.
If a school chooses this option,

additional space.

it is supplied with

It may receive portable classrooms or space

in the building of another school which is underenrolled.
In this way, the Alum Rock district has avoided racial

and ethnic segregation.

This is largely due to the fact that

the schools were well integrated before the voucher project
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began.

Even if all squatters were to exercise their rights,

the schools would be integrated.

While the procedures used have had no adverse effects
in Alum Rock, they may set a dangerous precedent.

In a comm-

unity in which whites and blacks are geographically segregated,
the granting of squatters* rights could result in maintaining
a

racially segregated school system.

Suppose that

large num-

a

ber of black parents decide that schools in white neighborhoods
are superior to their own.

They elect to send their children

to them but find that all places are filled by squatters.

The

faculty, perhaps influenced by parents, chooses not to expand
its facilities to include any more applicants.

This set of events is not at all unlikely.

The CSPP

Proposal contained provisions which would have prevented any
such occurences.

Since the proposal grants no special rights

to children attending neighborhood schools, all applicants are

placed on an equal footing.

Since schools are prohibited from

practicing discrimination, the hypothetical set of events presented could not occur.

The Alum Rock procedures represent

another divergence from the CSPP plan.
10. There should be no arbitrary expulsions.

Expulsions are dealt with uniformly through

a

district

code •
11

#

There should be an

E V/ A

to oversee the program.

ee

The Alum Rock EVAC is not autonomous in the
way the

CSPP intended its EVA to be.
ory.

Its capacity is strictly advis-

Control of the program remains with the district super-

intendant
The EVAC has no authority over participating schools.

The EVA could refuse to cash vouchers of schools failing to

observe all rules of the program.

The EVAC has no such power.

The regulatory functions which the EVA was designed to per-

form remain in the hands of the public schools.
12. The EVA should collect and distribute information

about schools as necessary.
Along with its co-ordination of student placements,
this is one of the EVAC*s two major tasks.
a pamphlet,

It publishes

printed in both Spanish and English, explaining

to parents how the voucher program operates.

Another biling-

ual pamphlet contains descriptions of programs of the various

mini-schools.
EVAC is responsible for hiring paraprof essionals whose

function is to advise parents on their educational options.
These counselors are themselves parents in the district.

They

are prohibited from making recommendations but may amplify
the printed descriptions of schools in order to aid parents
in their decisions.

(Some counselors admit to making recom-

mendations to friends or to parents who ask for one.)

89

The objective of the foregoing analysis
is a compar-

ison of the operations of the project with the
specifications
of the CSPP,

and 12.

The project meets specifications 1,
2, 4, 10,

There is no plan to expand the project beyond Alum

Rock in the foreseeable future.

period.

There uas

a

year long planning

The area includes only one municipality.

no arbitrary expulsions.

There are

The El/AC collects and distributes

pertinent information to parents.
The project meets specification

fails to in another.

heterogeneous.

3

in one respect and

The area is racially and ethnically

However, it is economically thoroughly homo-

genous .
The project fails to meet specifications 5, 6, 7, 8,
9,

and 11.

the program.

No private schools are permitted to take part in

The program extends beyond grade six.

All

children of appropriate age are not eligible to participate.
The CSPP guidelines on admission policies are not met.

The

EVAC has a much weaker role than was projected for the EVA.
A

discussion of the significance of this comparison

will be deferred to the next chapter.

For now, we note that

the specifications which the project fails to meet seem on

the most part to be more important than those it meets.

Questions of which schools and which students may participate
vital to
and the process by which they select each other seem

the CSPP voucher plan.

They are precisely the questions on
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uhich the differences between
theory and practice are most
outstanding

The second objective of the field
study uas an examination of the attitudes of certain
project participants. The

technique used uas one involving questions
of theoretical import.
Responses uere recorded and transcribed.
Four intervieus uere conducted.

The first two involved

members of the projects administrative staff.

These uere

Dr. Levin, Project Director, and Mr. Sanchez,
Co-ordinator of

parent information services.

The second tuo intervieus involved

representatives of the local council of the CTA.

The first

of these intervieus uas uith Mr. Dames Essaman, Executive

Director of the Mount Hamilton Council of the CTA.

The second

uas a joint intervieu uith Mr. Luke Levers, President of the

Alum Rock Educators* Association and uith Mr. Leroy Uiens,

Chairman of the Certified Employees* Council.

The Alum Rock

Educators* Association is one of six such associations making
up the Mount Hamilton Council.

The Certified Employees* Coun-

cil is the negotiating arm of the Alum Rock Educators* Associa-

tion and also acts on behalf of the local American Education

Research Council, the American Federation of Teachers, the
Alum Rock Administrators* Association, and the Association of

Special Services Employees.
The format for the presentation of edited transcripts
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is as follows.

Questions will be printed as they were
asked.

The interviewee *s response will follow
preceded by his initial
and a colon.
In the course of the presentation, it
will be

appropriate to insert comments designed to key the
examination
to issues of theoretical import.

Such comments will be set

off from the main body of the transcripts by asterisks.

Interv iew with Dr. Levin .

Has the project lived up to

your expectations?
L: Yes.

Uhat makes you say so?
L: There's a whole array of facts to indicate the pro-

ject is working.

The creation of significant alternative

forms of education is a fact.
is a fact.

The use of options by parents

Those were the purposes of the program and this

is what is actually happening.

Isn*t there more to it than that?

Isn't part of the

idea to test the performance of public schools against par-

ochial and private alternatives?
L:

I

don't know how important

a

part that plays, really.

I'm of the opinion that using parochial schools would be un-

constitutional.
I

schools?

think that's an open question.
I

Uhat about private

understand that some teachers wanted to open

free school here but it was opposed.

a
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L:

It's possible that in

a

feu years uhen people are

less threatened than they are now, ue can
do this,

Ue are

still negotiating about it.
Some of your critics in the district say that
this is
just an attempt to keep the word ’’voucher" alive,
that this

isn’t really a voucher program.
L:

Uhen

I

hear that,

I

Uhat do you say to that?

feel good.

It means that ue

aren’t threatening them, that they are going to let us get on
uith the project.
But wouldn’t a real voucher be a threat? Certainly

Shanker thinks so.

The state CTA thinks so too.

L: Uhat’s a real voucher?

Ue’ve given schools the

opportunity to innovate as they want and parents

a

choice.

That’s the real purpose of the program and that's uhat ue've
done.
**-*

This last statement represents a major shift in position

from original writings on the subject.

A

number of writers

discussed in Chapter II, notably 3encks (1966), Clark (1969),
and Levin (1968), argued that vouchers were a form of demono-

polizing education.

The intention of such a system would be

to force public schools to create options and to compete uith

fresh ideas from non-public sources.

Jencks (1966) indicates

that in a true voucher system, the notion of public and non-

public schools as different kinds of educational entities
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breaks down altogether.
During the initial planning stage of the
project, the
Mount Hamilton CTA quickly indicated that there
was no possibility of support from teachers unless competition
were limited to the public schools.
The projects proponents shifted
their thinking auay from the idea of competition among
all

interested schools and settled for competition among public
schools alone.
The CTA rightfully labels a voucher program uhich in-

cludes competition from non— public schools

•'real" voucher

a

program since that is the only kind of program uhich they had
any reason to believe uas being planned.

No uriter on the

subject has discussed a voucher model uhich does not include

non-public schools.
Once it uas agreed that vouchers could not be used to

threaten the position of the public schools, uhat uas left
of the program served to benefit teachers.

Such benefits in-

clude greater managerial responsibility, greater freedom in

choosing and designing programs, and increased funds for pur-

chasing equipment and training.
•***

If uhat has been achieved is just that

and greater parent participation

—

—

more programs

couldn*t that have been

achieved uithout using vouchers?
L: Maybe it could have, but it uasn*t.

This district
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has been receiving Title

I

funds for a long time and they come

to much more than the money allocated
to the voucher program.

But the much smaller voucher investment has
produced much more

change.

There are more programs, more teachers involved
in

management, more parent participation and all this is the
result of vouchers*

***
Several more questions were asked on thi3 topic*
ansuers did not progress beyond the one given*

The

It does not

seem satisfactory.

Everyone in the district seems to agree that parents
are more involved in the schools than they were*

ation of program alternatives is a fact.

The prolifer-

However, Alum Rock

has a history of strong parent involvement.

Its teachers have

been yearning to innovate for years, according to their oun

reports.

Lack of money has been one of the chief stumbling

blocks.
The voucher program did bring funds into the district.
It is clear that those funds have made a difference.

Uhat

is not clear is the necessity of labelling those funds "educ-

ation vouchers" in order to achieve the result obtained.
***
I

want to ask you some questions about the differences

between your program and the CSPP Proposal.

Why did you add
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squatters* rights,
L:

Basically, ue did that because ue had too.

Parents

were upset thinking that they might not be able to go to
their

neighborhood schools.
To the extent that you are a model for future voucher

programs, isn*t this a dangerous precedent?

In an already

segregated district, couldn’t this serve to keep segregation
in existence?
L: Ue’ve found that even uhen people have squatters*

rights they don’t always use them.

But other districts will

have to make these arrangements based on local conditions.

Another precedent that seems dangerous to me is tying
the EV/AC to the Superintendent,

Once you bring in non-public

schools, if that happens, uon’t the

E\/AC

have to become in-

dependant?
L: Not necessarily.

The CTA position is that those

schools must meet the same standards as the public schools,
Will that affect the willingness of private schools to

enter the program?
Ls That’s something ue don’t know at this point.

It's

too early to tell what will happen,

***
The interview with Dr, Levin was considerably longer

than the section presented here,

A

major portion of the results

of
of the interview have been presented in the discussion
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our first objective (pp.
ei“9o) and in the presentation of

background material

(

pp. 78-81).

Additional references to

the interview will be made in discussing
objectives 3a and
3b.

As with all other interviews presented and
discussed in

this chapter, a general discussion will be
deferred until

Chapter V.

Interview wit h Hr. Sanchez .

Transcripts of this inter-

view will not be presented since its relevance to the issues
with which the field study was concerned is limited.

However,

Mr. Sanchez* views will be summarized briefly since they offer

additional insights into the nature of the focus of the Alum
Rock project.
Mr* Sanchez* job is the collection of information con-

cerning schools and programs and its distribution to parents.
The project employs a number of parents as advisors to other

parents in the district.

They serve to interpret printed in-

formation and to aid parents in their educational choices.
Mr. Sanchez is the supervisor of these counselors.
He views the goals of the voucher project as a means

of radicalizing parents in the district.

The effects of

voucher participation upon educational quality are secondary
in his view to the effects upon parents.

His attitude may be legitimate.

It is certainly at

cross-purposes to the goals of the CSPP Proposal.

In that
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proposal, the primaryy yucu.
goal xs
is thp
inwinnr a f
rne mvigoration
of public educatxon through the use of
competition. A result of the fulfillment of that goal may be
greater parental pouer over
education. Other expected
by-products include greater equality of educational opportunity,
greater racial and ethnic
f

integration, and an increased acceptance
of educational axperimentation
To choose any of these secondary
goals as the primary

focus of the project is bound to produce
distortions in the
program. Such distortions have in fact occured.
The schools have not been satisfied uith the
perform-

ance of the parent counselors.

They have demanded

in the orientation of the counselors* role.

a

change

Beginning uith

the 1973-4 school year, counselors uere assigned to individual

schools rather than to Mr. Sanchez* office.

Principals expect

counselors in the future to act in some uays as agents of
the schools to which they are assigned.

They uill present

information concerning a particular program uithin the school
to parents who request it, but may not present information

about programs in any other school.

Reaction to Mr. Sanchez* approach to parent information
services has resulted in a limitation of the functions of the
EVAC.

It appears that information uill not flou quite as

freely as it once did.

This is an unfortunate result which

ought to be noted in plans for future voucher programs.
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I

n t eruieu

with Hr. Esaaman .

I'm assuming that because

you represent the CTA you're
against vouchers.

Is that a

reasonable assumption?
E:

That depends on uhat you mean by
vouchers.

Uhat

ue have here isn't a voucher at
all.

Uhat do you mean by a voucher?
E:

This program has only public schools.

Uhen the

legislature first considered the bill, they were talking
about
allowing any certified school to participate. This
is just

a way of

pumping money into low income areas.

It's also kept

the word "voucher" alive for another try.
How would you feel about a real voucher program?
E: Ue'll fight it.

That seems paradoxical.

You don*t like this program

because it doesn't allow private schools, but if it did you
still wouldn't like it.
E:

Maybe you wouldn't like it even more.

Uhat I'm saying is don't even call this a voucher

since it isn't.

Ue defeated vouchers in the legislature, so

they changed the idea to make it acceptable and called it by
the same name.
In your opinion,

how much does this program resemble

the original idea?
E:

The only thing left is that parents can send their

kids to any school they want.

The whole thing is so unimport-

ant that the state CTA council hasn't taken a position on it.
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They don't care about it at all?
E: They have dropped it from the list of situations

they watch.
But if a private school tried to apply for voucher

funds?
They would be against it and so would we.

E:

Thera

would be wild opposition.
How do you feel the program is working?
E:

Parents don't know what to do.

A

lot of them take

a shotgun approach and send each kid to a different school and

see what happens.

A

lot of people are leaving their neighbor-

hood schools this year but

were doing.

I

don't think they knew what they

Someone who doesn't know what he's doing is not

going to be able to pick

a

successful teacher.

One of the arguments for vouchers is that parents are
in a good position to choose for their kids because they know

them best.
E:

I'm not sure they do know best.

Parents know

what clothes their kids like, but they can't make medical de-

cisions for their kids.
They choose the doctor.
E:

But we're talking about choosing a program, not an

individual.
***
already
This argument from parental incompetence has
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been discussed (see pp. 49-5^.
a good one if his

Mr. Essaman's point uould be

analogy were valid.

Ue do not allow parents

to prescribe medication and
treatment for their children

(beyond a certain point) because there exists
a body of expert opinion concerning medical matters. Since
medical pract-

itioners d£ know better than parents how to treat
illness,

their opinion is given great weight.
There is no analogous body of expert opinion in educ-

ation.

No clearer case could be made for this statement than

to point to the way in which children actually are placed
in

schools.

Children are placed in their neighborhood school

because it i3 their neighborhood school.

That is the reason.

Alternatively, they are placed in a non-neighborhood school
in order to achieve a desired racial balance.

Presumably, if a more expert means of placing children
in school were in our possession, ue uould use it.

The fact

that ue do things the uay ue do is the strongest reason for

supposing that ue lack the means to do it any better.
Therefore, the analogy betueen education and medicine
is faulty.

M

If parents are incompetent,

they must not be

alloued to make educational choices” is not a proven statement.
And, of course, parents may sometimes be competent to make the

requisite decisions.
***
Hou are teachers being affected by the program?
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E: Some teachers resent having to
compete.

minority.

A

They’re

a

number of teachers have advertised.

I’ve heard about a matchbook cover ad for a
program.

Did that really happen?
No comment.

E:

Uhich school ua3 it?
No comment.

E:

***
A

feu teachers mentioned that such advertising had

been used but would not say uhere or when.

No one else in the

district uas willing to talk about it.
***
How else are teachers being affected?
E: Teachers who like the program like it for the money.

Vouchers have moved a lot of federal money into Alum Rock.
They also get a lot more freedom, more responsibility in man-

aging school affairs

—

things we’ve been pushing for for years.

How would you change the program?
E;

Ue need to make changes in the district contract

to protect teachers who may get left out by vouchers.

there is no spot for

a

teacher who wants out of

school, we want that teacher to be paid anyway.

a

If

voucher
That needs

to be cleared up in our next contract meeting.

***
fir.

Essaman uas the strongest local critic of the pro-
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gram encountered in the course
of the field study.
The interview with him was unsatisfying
since it did not reveal to any

appreciable extent the uay in which
theoretical issues are
being dealt with in the pragmatic realm.

No doubt this is

partly due to the fact that Mr. Essaman
does not agree that
a voucher program is in operation
in Alum Rock.
His view is that the project is keeping the
issue alive

while pouring large quantities of money into
classrooms.

His

concern is that the money pours in without adversely
affecting
the rights of teachers.

final statement indicates that vouchers may become

even less threatening to educational monopolists than they

were at the time of the study.

If teachers can choose not to

compete without penalty of any kind, it is clear that many
of the weakest ones will elect to remain out of the program

entirely.

Since one of the supposed benefits of competition

is the fact that it weeds out the poorest choices, such action

would be a blow to efforts to implement the CSPP Proposal more
fully.
In the following interview with Mr. Levers and Mr.

Uiens, the conversation tended to touch on issues of more

basic concern.

Uhile their stand is much less extreme than

Mr. Essaman*s, it is nevertheless quite firm on a number of

crucial points.
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I.nteruieu uith

Plr.

Levers a n d

llr.

Diana .

Uhy have

the Alum Rock teachers agreed
to participate in a voucher

program?
U: The teachers in Alum Rock
agreed to give their bless-

ing on a voluntary basis to the program.
its blessing by not opposing the program.

Then the CTA gave
By the uay,

the

NEA and the AFT are still opposed.

Uhy?
U: Uhat they oppose is the use of federal funds
in sup-

port of private schools.

They were ready to drop their oppos-

ition and take a neutral stand until the Neu Hampshire idea
came up.

Then they went back.

Now they're fighting anything

uith the word "voucher " in it.

***
The reference to Neu Hampshire concerns attempts by

the National Institute on Education to implement in Neu Hamp-

shire a voucher program in uhich private schools uould be per-

mitted to participate.

The program is generally thought of

as an outgrouth of the Friedman Proposal, but is actually much

closer in spirit to the Egalitarian Model (see p. 13).

The

program uill be discussed briefly in Chapter V.
***
Uhat are your oun feelings about vouchers?
L:

Vouchers have really changed things for the better
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in Alum Rock.

Parents are more involved, teachers
can be
more creative in their planning
and teaching, and

they can

take more control of school management.
a

first step.

Still, this is only

Ue've only begun to be involved with
vouchers.

Ue just don't knou what will
happen in four or five years if

the program continues.

can't imagine.

There are neu developments uhich ue

And you can't predict uhat will happen when

you transfer these ideas to another district.
One thing that appeals to me about vouchers is
that

they make job security for teachers contingent upon performance.
Lihy

a

should anyone, including the NEA and the AFT, oppose such

sensible idea?
L:

Those provisions are totally unnecessary.

The in-

competent teachers are already dealt with in state lau.

There

are uell defined procedures for removing an incompetent teacher.

Ue're not against removing incompetent individuals from

classrooms.

Ue'd like to see these people removed.

isn't our job to do it.

But it

It's up to the principals, and they

haven't been using their pouer in this area.
U: This is a good point.

Administrators don't make

use of their options in this area,

Most of them lack the cou-

rage to charge a teacher with incompetence and then carry

through uith hearings.

There is no reason for there being an

incompetent teacher in any classroom in this state.

You don't
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need vouchers to solve this problem.

***
Of course, the point can be made that vouchers
are

needed to solve this problem since the available remedies
are
not being used.

***
U (cont.): This brings up something else that bothers

me about vouchers.

There is no provision being made for teach-

ers who don*t uant to participate in the program.

there uere only six schools participating.
uill be thirteen.

Next year

Last year

This year there

imagine there will be more.

I

The people who don*t uant to be in the program are going to
be gradually squeezed out, and ue are going to have to do

something to help those people.
Uhy should anyone be exempted from the rigors of the

marketplace?

To refuse to compete sounds almost like an ad-

mission of incompetence.
L: That isn*t so because ue are moving into a period

of fairly strong standards for tenure and performance.

the Stahl Bill

(

a

Under

stateuide evaluative system) there are

specific rules on uhen tenure is terminated.
along uith the CTA draus up

a

The school board

list of particulars.

An evalu-

ator decides if the teacher has met the standards for the

grade level.

If the evaluator does his job, there's no pro-

1

blem.

Either the teacher did

a

job or didn’t.

06

But with

vouchers you take auay the evaluator and leave the
decision
in the hands of the mini-schools.

That is no legal policy,

***
The transcript of this section of the interview could
be extended for many pages.

The discussion soon bogged doun

into a repetition of the interviewees* claim.
It is not at all clear that the appeal to pre-existing

legal standards argues against the advantages of free market

competition.

The two can be made to complement each other.

Consideration of the analogous case of the grading of apples,
an example well worked by some Oxford philosophers, may help
to clarify the issue.

The government sets certain standards in the grading
of apples.

Utility,

Apples may be graded from Grade

A

Fancy doun to

Definite standards to be used in grading are pub-

lished by the Department of Agriculture and it is possible for
an individual to become a competent grader of apples in a rel-

atively short period of time.
Once an objective judgement has been made concerning
an apple’s grade, it is still possible for an efficient mar-

ket to make finer distinctions among the members of any one

grade.

As a result, some apples will be more apt to be chosen

than others, and some will not be chosen at all.
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Government standards uill prevent

a

rotten apple or

one which is badly spotted or too small from
becoming a Grade
A

apple.

a

given grade are equal in every respect.

Such standards uill not insure that all apples of
There are still

decisions for the consumer of apples to make.
Similarly, state standards, properly applied, which
they are not, uill eliminate incompetence from the educational

marketplace.

But competence does not entail excellence.

There

is still room for decision on the part of the consumer of

education
Pre-existing legal standards help to make decisions
easier for consumers of apples and of education in two ways.
They make a rough categorization prior to the consumer's se-

lection and they eliminate choices which ought not to be accepted anyway.

A

reliance on an efficient legal standard in-

sures only that bad apples and bad teachers have disappeared
from the marketplace.

Such reliance does not guarantee that

each consumer receives the best apple or teacher he can.
Given a group of teachers, all of them competent, some
uill tend to be chosen by parents before others for some reason

which those doing the choosing think important.

It may happen

that some teachers uill not be chosen even though they are

certif iably competent.

In this way the marketplace tends to

make precisely those distinctions which the consumers of educ-
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ation wish to make at any particular time.

***
Uhat is the effect of competition on teachers?
L:

I

don't think there have been any strong effects.

If you really uant the answer to that,

in three years.

come back and see us

Uhen there are hardly any non-voucher schools

left, ue'll know more.
But haven't some schools lost enrollment?

How do

teachers react to that?
L:

This has happenned uhen there has been an exit of

teachers and administrators from those schools.
U: Ue have tuo concerns in this area.

One is that ue

have locked parents into voucher schools not favorable to

vouchers.

If you look around,

you'll see that there are a

small number of voucher schools which have had

adjustment.

a

difficult

On the other hand, ue have locked parents out

of voucher schools uhen they wanted to get into them.

same thing applies to teachers.

A

The

lot of them uant either

in or out of vouchers and it will take time before it all gets

settled
Do teachers uant into voucher schools because of the

increased funding?
in
L: Uhen ue took a vote on extending the program

additional $179,000
one school, ue announced that there uas an
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in funding available.

Only $50,000 of this uas from vouchers.

They could have had a nice funding even
uithout vouchers, so
I don*t think it*s just the
money.
The money helps them do
a

better job.

Teachers uant to develop programs and improve

uhat they*re doing.
U: Another point.

CTA has been in favor of developing

the autonomy of local schools.

Before vouchers, ue had the

pouer to create this kind of change but no money to do it uith.
That explains uhy teachers are auare of funds.

Teachers used

to pay out of their oun pockets for materials.
Is the administration of the program creating neu

levels of bureaucracy to deal uith?
L: Principals object to any neu authority.

(Dr. Levin*s) position is necessary.

But Doel*s

This year uas the first

that the legislature voted the school budget uithin fifteen

days of the opening of school, but schools have to have their

budgets in by Duly

1 .

In that kind of situation you need to

have someone uho is responsible.
U:

I

uanted to get back to this business of job sec-

Ue didn*t mention before that a group of teachers from

urity.

this district are getting together to develop

outside of any existing schools.

a

neu program

The GEO is very hesitant

about this, but the CTA is all for it.
I

thought you said you uere against that sort of thing.
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These teachers are from the district
so they're not
putting anybody out of a job. And this
uill be a neu school.
A traditional private school
has so many advantages over a
public school in terms of funding from private
sources, more
money for better materials, buildings, and so
on, that there
really couldn't be fair competition. But give
teachers an
U:

equal footing and the public schools uill uin out
every time.
Let them both follou the state codes on curriculum
and dis-

cipline, give them the same rules and rights, the same student
policies, and the public schools uill uin.
So you uould uant to exclude a Summerhill school or a

Montessori school or anything of that type.
U: A Summerhill school couldn't operate uithin our

school board's policies.
for them.

You*d have to make

a

That's just uhat ue uant to avoid.

special case
Let them com-

pete on an equal footing and uithout any unfair advantage,
and it uill be all right.
As long as they aren’t putting CTA teachers out of

uork.
U? Right.

But that isn't really competition.

You uant to give

the public schools everything and leave to the private schools

the leftovers.
U: No.

Look, a company in business has

a

neu product.

Ill

They don't fire ev/erybody making older
products.

uith the neu one.

They expand

By maintaining the present structure
ue

have an excess of teachers.

By expanding our operation ue

could create a need uhich couldn't be filled
even by the un-

employed teachers.

For example, ue have a teacher of deaf

children in this district.

Ue uere able to provide more

funding for her and nou she has a program for siblings of deaf
children#

Uith more money you could expand any program.

could extend educational programs to parents.

You

There are so

many possibilities that there is no problem in finding avenues
for teaching talent.

Uith private school vouchers, if they

are competing equally, you are essentially just reinventing
the wheel#

There is so much uork to be done uith public

funds for public schools that there is no reason to spread
the money to private schools.
*-•**

This is a restatement of the first argument used to

justify the existence of monopolies, the argument from tech-

nological inefficiency (see p. 48-49)#

Competition to public

education is characterized as wasteful replication.

Of course,

if private schools are forced to model themselves after public

ones in every important detail, as Uiens insists, then they
will be reinventing the wheel#
If parents choose educational programs,

there seems
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to be no reason uhy they could not choose among
various

curricular orientations and various disciplinary styles.
Tying the argument from technological inefficiency to
ific set of standards

public schools

—

—

a

spec-

in this case the set used by the

leads instead to the second argument, which

states that parents are incompetent to make decisions.

Pre-

vious comments on that argument can be applied to choices

concerning curriculum and discipline (see pp, 49-52, 99-100).
***
Do you have any final comments to make?
L:

Dust this.

For a program like this to uork, the

district has to be in a position to take risks.
was in a position to take risks.

Alum Rock

Ue risked running into

trouble uith the PTA, the CTA, the Mount Hamilton Council
and a couple of other groups.

Ue had to balance the risks

of trouble uith these groups against the money ue uould get

from the government.

The district had to have that money.

Taxes are very light; incomes are lou.
by money.

Teachers uere defeated

They uere spending money out of their own pockets.

So ue chanced it.

For a uealthy district, there uould be

very feu risks indeed.

But as far as ue can tell, our risk

taking paid off.
as
The foregoing transcripts uere intended to present

accurately as possible the attitudes of project participants
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towards education vouchers.
briefly as follows.

Those attitudes may be summarized

The teachers* representatives are willing

to support the program only when it serves the
interests of

teachers.

Absolutely no compromises on this point have been

made, and it seems clear that none are forthcoming.

V/ouchers

appear to have brought teachers more money for materials, more
freedom in program construction, and more managerial responsibility. (These points will be explored further in discussion
of the remaining objectives.)

The teachers* representatives

have permitted the program to operate to the extent that it
has provided them with these benefits.

The project staff, for its part, perceives that educ-

ation in the district is better than it was before the beginning of the project.

They justifiably reason that these bene-

fits are a result of education vouchers.

In order to achieve

what they have, it has been necessary to sacrifice some of
the most important points of the CSPP Proposal.

The resulting

program is so different from the original intentions that
The attitude of the voucher

it has been called a counterfeit.

project staff is that the sacrifices are justified by the

educational results.

In short,

they are willing to sacrifice

the main thrust of the voucher proposal in order to achieve

some of the expected side effects.
They have little choice.

The program can operate on

the terms of the Mount Hamilton CTA or not at all.

Even
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though the

program diverges sharply from the CSPP Proposal,

the administrator maintains the attitude that
the achieve-

ments of the program are due to the use of vouchers.

attitude will be critically examined in Chapter

This

V.

Objective 3a of the field study is an assessment of
the demonstrated capacity of families to make educational

choices
on
1972-

a

rational basis.

will be brief.
3

The discussion of this issue

Dr. Levin*s records indicate that in the

school year, only 3$ of families in voucher schools

chose to send their children outside the neighborhood school.
1973The figures for 1973-4 indicate that nearly 14$ were sending
their children to non-neighborhood schools.
4

During the

school year 38$ of families with more than one child

uere sending their children to at least tuo schools.

Dr.

Levin cites these tuo latter facts as indications of increased

parental decision-making.
His opinion and the opinion of the parent counselors

intervieued is that parents are trying to make the correct

decision for their children.

Counselors noted that parents

uere asking more probing questions and more of them in 1973
than they did in 1972.

They felt that many parents uere

really just beginning to get to knou their children.

As that

process continues* they expect the quality of decision-making
to improve accordingly.
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It is

difficult to assess the meaning of these figures.

Mr. Essaman feels that parents are choosing blindly, but

this attitude is as much a consequence of his views as an

observation on the data.
Although some parents are making decisions of some
sort, it remains that over 86$ are still sending their children to their neighborhood school.

This may be because they

are satisfied with the school and it may be because they do
not know uhat else to do.

sufficient for

a

The available information is in-

further determination.

Some 62$ of families with more than one child are

sending all their children to the same school.

Given

a

family of six children (the average family size in Alum Rock),
uhat is the probability that all of them are best suited to
the same type of educational program?

Perhaps the answer

then parents in Alum Rock are indeed choosing

is 62$.

If so,

wisely.

It is more likely that the true probability is much

lower, but we have no information to guide us to the answer.
For now, our information is too spotty and the Alum

Rock project is too young for the question phrased in Objective
3a to be answered.

Objective 3b of the field study is an assessment of
greater
whether the existence of competition has created

diversity in the schools.

Our answer to this question can
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be definite.

Before the introduction of vouchers
there were

only two types of classrooms in Alum Rock.

The majority

were variations of traditional classrooms.

The remainder were

open classrooms.

Because of lack of money, many teachers uho

wanted to expand their classroom operations into new areas
were unable to do so,

A

creative urge was unquestionably

strong in many teachers but remained unsatisfied due to lack
of funds.

When vouchers brought uith them significant federal

funding, an innovative explosion appears to have taken place.
For the 1973-4 school year, thirteen schools participated.

Uithin these schools were forty-tuo programs.
been classified by the

EV/AC

They have

into nine basic types.

The

categories are in all cases self-explanatory.
Fifteen programs are classified as Traditional/Academic
Six are classified as Learning by Doing.

Innovative/Open Classroom.

Five are considered

There are four Individualized

Learning Programs and four Fine and Creative Arts programs.
Three programs are classified Multi-Cultural and three more
are reserved for Kindergarteners.

Tuo programs are Bilingual/

Bicultural and one is reserved for gifted students.
A

by Doing,

brief analysis indicates the following.

If Learning

Innovative/Open Classroom and Individualized Learn-

ing programs are considered species of the same genus, then
it appears that there are an equal number of traditional and

•'innovative" classroom programs in operation.

Of the remain-
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ing twelve programs, three are restricted to
Kindergarteners

and one is restricted to gifted children.

There are nine

programs left which do not fit easily into popular educational categories.

These nine programs are all thoroughly new,

the result of creativity on the part of the teachers who

developed them.
This last group represents 21 % of the total.

If we

lump this group with the "innovative" classroom programs,
we find that some 57$> of the programs are in one way or another

out of the ordinary.

In comparison, the programs of non-

voucher schools lean much more heavily to the traditional

classroom.
It is clear that diversity in the schools is a fact.

Our question asks if the diversity was the result of com-

petition.

It does not appear that this is the case.

The

teachers in this district wanted to innovate before vouchers
were introduced.

They were able to do so after vouchers were

introduced only because vouchers carried extra money into the
district.

Had vouchers not brought such funds into Alum

Rock, it is not at all clear that teachers could have brought

about the changes which did occur.
had
If the money which enabled the teachers to change

the
come in some other form, perhaps as a direct grant from

would
federal government, it seems likely that innovations
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have occurred.

In short,

these teachers wanted to innovate.

They did not require competition as a stimulus
to motivate

them to innovate.

Uhat they did require ua 3 money.

Only

in the sense that vouchers provided money can they
be said
to be the cause of the resulting diversity.

The final objective of the field study is an investi-

gation of how, if at all, participation in the voucher project
has affected the roles of principals and teachers.

cipals were interviewed.

Six prin-

These were the principals of the six

schools which had completed their first year of participation
in the project at the time of the study.

Their names and

schools follow.
1.

Mr. Donald Ayers, Millard McCollam School,

2.

Mr. Thomas Fay, Donal Meyer School,

3.

Mr. Armen Hanzad, Pala School,

4. Mr.

Dames 0*Berg, Mildred Goss School,

5. Mr. Frank Uilkens,

Grandin Miller School, and

l

6. Mr.

Derry Uitt, Sylvia Cassell School.

Mr. Uilkens had a number of strong reservations con-

cerning the ability of vouchers to change the roles of principals and teachers,

Mr. 0*Berg felt that participation in

the program had produced radical changes at his school.

The

moderate,
remaining four principals held positive, but more

views
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Mr. Uilkens felt that vouchers had
enormous potential.
At the time of our discussion,

he felt that that potential

had not been fulfilled to any important extent.

Uhile a great many programs had developed, Mr.
Uilkens
felt that these mere not substantially different from
pre-

existing programs.

He felt that teachers had been promised

much more autonomy than they actually received.
As the planning year progressed, Mr. Uilkens learned

that his teachers could not come to any common agreement on

goals for the school.

They split into factional camps.

teachers uere not included in any group.

Some

Hurt feelings, un-

spoken resentments and devastated teaching performances uere
the result.

Uhen it came time for parents to begin making their

selections, a number of teachers at Miller School began openly

campaigning for vouchers.
advertising.

There were accusations of unfair

The practice was stopped by district officials.

Uhen the dust had cleared from these events, Miller

School learned that the families who had been attending it
had strong loyalties to the school.

As a result, Miller was

oversubscribed and the efforts to secure an adequate market
had proven unnecessary.
Mr. Uilkens saw no change in his role as principal.

evaluator,
He remained chief disciplinarian, business manager,

operation
and considered himself responsible for the smooth
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of educational programs.

Mr. Uilkens noted that it is impossible to transfer

teacher out of

a

school against the teacher*s will.

a

As a re-

sult, teachers uho do not approve of program changes or uho
do not wish to participate in any mini— school program can dis-

turb the life of the entire school.

Teachers uho cannot fit

comfortably into any program must be forced to join one program or another.

A

number of difficult situations have arisen

as a result.

Four principals uere optimistic about changes uhich had

occured, though not without some reservations.

These princi-

pals included Mr. Hanzad, Mr. Ayers, Mr. Uitt, and Mr. Fay.
Mr. Hanzad felt that the program’s biggest contribution

uas in the financial opportunity uhich it had given to the

community.

His school had been successful in attracting mem-

bers of the community to meetings where they became involved
in planning programs and budgets.

However, Mr. Hanzad pointed

out that his school has always enjoyed strong parental involve-

ment .
His school had taken the radical step of including stu-

dents on the advisory board of each mini-school.
that students had made

a

He felt

meaningful contribution to the school’s

operation
result of parHe felt that teachers had changed as a
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ticipation in the program.
innovative and have

a

In his view they have become more

stronger commitment to finding effective

solutions to their educational problems.

He emphasized that

these traits had aluays been present in the staff
and that

vouchers had enabled them to become active.
His oun role underuent major changes.

The assistant

principal has taken over most duties relating to business management and curriculum development.

The principal himself is

less involved in disciplinary problems because there are now

feuer problems of that kind.

At the same time, the program

has created a large number of visitors.

Mr. Hanzad spends a

great deal of time showing visitors around the school and talking with them.

Much of the rest of his time is spent selling

the Pala program to parents and explaining the program to el-

ementary teachers in the hope of creating greater curriculum

articulation.

(Pala is a middle school.)

Mr. Ayers reported similar changes.

Because vouchers

were involving teachers in more decisions concerning curriculum
and budget management, his oun involvement in these areas had

decreased markedly.

Like Mr. Hanzad, he had become more in-

volved in public relations and in dissemination of information
than in direct decision making.
He stated that because teachers feel that they are in
a

"fishbowl" they are more highly motivated to work harder.

him to
As they have done more work, there has been less for
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do.

His participation in decision
making ua3 limited to fee-

ilitation of others* decisions.
He felt that the organization
of his school had been

autocratic before the implementation of
the program.
participation in school affairs by teachers

Increased

and parents had

transformed the organization into

a

much more democratic one,

in his vieu.

Mr, Uitt of the Cassell School uas openly
impressed with

the program and felt that it offered many advantages
to stu-

dents,

He uas the only principal to comment that the fact

that students uere at the schools by choice seemed to give

them more motivation to learn,

Vouchers had caused his teachers* roles to change.
His opinion is that they are under a fair amount of pressure
to attract students to their programs.

He feels that the

teachers have accepted this pressure and used it positively.

Teachers at Cassell spent more time in voluntary planning
sessions during the summer of 1973 than at any previous time.
His oun role had changed in ways similar to those men-

tioned by

Mr.

Ayers and Mr. Hanzad.

Instead of having to run

one school with six hundred students by himself, Mr. Uitt had

four people to run four schools of one hundred fifty each.
His oun job became much more that of an advisor and facilita-

tor.

Unlike Mr. Ayers and Mr. Hanzad, Mr. Uitt did not choose
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to spend a great deal of time involved
in public relations.

One change which Mr. Uitt was alone in noting
was some increase
in paperwork as a result of vouchers.

Perhaps the fact that

principals were passing most of their paperwork along to heads
of mini-schools is the reason others did not mention the
same

thing.
Mr. Fay was available for a very brief interview. He

seemed to agree in substance with all that has been said by
the three previous principals.

He had abdicated a large amount

of responsibility for the operation of the school and had de-

legated it to teachers.
The reason for the brevity of the interview points out
one of the pitfalls which participating may fall into.

During

the early part of the summer of 1973, the school had become
Mr. Fay left it to the teachers to decide what

overenrolled.

to do with them.

The teachers decided that the additional

voucher income seemed attractive and decided to open their
doors to all applicants.

The consequence of this decision was

that the school was going to have to move beyond its own

walls and add

a

number of portable classrooms, but the teachers

did not carefully consider this fact.
In the words of one teacher,

be someone else who*d have to go."

"Everyone thought it would
During the last week of
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August, 1973, uhen this v/isit took place,
several teachers
were furious because they were being
transferred from their
former classrooms to portables.
In the process of trying to
(

secure an interview/ with them, they told me that
they had been
in tears all morning and were not speaking
to anyone.)
In this case the diffusion of responsibility meant
that

no one is taking any responsibility at all.

The combination

of a serious miscalculation by teachers, their principals mic-

calculat ion of their ability to make decisions, and an emotional situation promised to ruin morale for weeks.

Mr. 0*Berg was the most enthusiastic supporter of the

voucher program among the principals.

He also had the strong-

est views concerning the effect of vouchers on the roles of

principals and teachers.
He agreed that principals will take on less and less

direct responsbility for decision making.

He went further and

predicted that the voucher program may cause the role of the
principal to disappear altogether.

He viewed this as a pos-

itive development and sees signs of the dissolution of his
role at his school.

His teachers were making more decisions

without consulting him and he was encouraging them to do so.
He felt that his role will shift towards program development

and research, although his title may change.
In his view, the influx of federal funds attached to
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vouchers has had

a

great effect on his teachers.

The money

helped to create fresh possibilities in the minds of
his staff.
They were able to take

a

toward their students.

more creative and positive attitude
He observed that teachers were more

conscientious about their work during the first year of voucher

operation than they were previously.

He felt that their ap-

proaches to problem solving were more creative and self-reliant .

With only one exception (Mr. Uilkens), principals

uniformly perceived major changes in their roles and in the
roles of their teachers.

It appears that vouchers have the

ability to influence management styles.

Diffusion of respons-

ibility, democratic decision making, and leadership through

facilitation are the chief hallmarks of vouchers* effects.
It is interesting that principals noticed the decrease

in their direct responsibility much more than teachers noticed

the increase in their oun.

Teachers seemed to notice the tan-

gible benefits of vouchers to the exclusion of others.
Twenty teachers were interviewed.

There were plans to

interview many more than this number, but the responses of the
initial group were so thoroughly uniform that further interviews were deemed unnecessary.
more
All teachers interviewed felt that parents uere

vouchers.
involved now than before the introduction of

Parents
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have always been involved in education in Alum Rock,
but had

become even more involved during the preceeding school year.
The only other change which teachers noted was the fact

that there is now

a

strong steady flow of federal money coming

directly to the schools.

In fact,

most teachers, when asked

what changes vouchers had produced, spoke in terms of equipment, materials, and other tangibles.
No teachers felt that they were under pressure as a

result of competition, although many claimed that there are

other teachers who are.
It was easy to develop the impression that teachers

were not really giving much thought to their position in the

voucher program.

More likely, teachers were simply too busy

with their teaching responsibilities to think about anything
else.

In any case,

their opinions concerning changes in their

role were not useful to the purposes of the study.

Chapter IV has presented

a

description of the voucher

operation in Alum Rock, attitudes of upper echelon participants,
and changes in the roles of those on the front lines.

turning to

a

Before

concluding chapter, some space will be devoted to

the findings of the Rand Corporation which were released by
Rock" (1973).
NIE in "Education Vouchers: The Experience at Alum

available.
These are the only findings of the Rand Study presently
of 1972, the
Two surveys were conducted, one in the Fall
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other in the Spring of 1973.

The pairs of numbers following

an entry indicate the 1972 and 1973 findings, respectively.
In its survey of parents, Rand found that:
1 •

Most parents like the idea of having

the schools their children attend
2.

(

a

choice about

83%, 95$),

Most parents believe that their children get

a

better

education if their parents select the school they go to (57$,
75 *),
3.

Most parents believed that giving them

choice makes

a

teachers more responsive to complaints and suggestions (66$, 76$),
4.

By 1973, most parents believed that they should help

to decide about hiring and firing of teachers
of principals

(36$, 53$), and

(52$, 69$),

5. Most parents believed that vouchers will provide

greater control over their childrens* education (53$, 69$),
and will improve the quality of education they receive (77$,

89$),
6.

In both Fall and Spring,

parents in Alum Rock were

20$ more satisfied with their schools than was

a

national

sample, and
7.

In the Spring,

25$ of parents believed that the

9-10).
program offerings of the schools were insufficient, (pp.
In its survey of teachers,
1.

In 1972,

improve education

Rand found that:

vouchers would
50$ of teachers believed that
In 1973 this figure was 51$.

However, in
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the Spring, teachers in v/oucher schools
agreed with the statement
74$ of the time, while only 33$ of teachers in
non-voucher schools
agreed. Among teachers joining the program for the
first time
in 1973,

56$ agreed.

2.

In response to the question "Aside from increased
funds,

uhich of the following are the main advantages of the voucher

demonstration?" the following responses were recorded.

Teachers

were permitted to make as many responses as they liked.

3.

4.

a.

Improved teacher teamwork (75$),

b.

Improved curriculum (87$),

c.

Student transfer option (66$),

d.

Good learning experience for teachers (84$),

e.

More authority for teachers

f.

Greater opportunity to innovate (96$),

g.

Upgrading of teachers* professional role (57$),

h.

Greater parent involvement (72$).

(

67$),

The following disadvantages were noted:
a.

Too many meetings (87$)

b.

Pressure from parents (15$).

In the Spring,

83$ of the teachers in voucher schools

thought the program was helping students, uhile only 30$ of the

teachers in non-voucher schools thought so.
5.

Two-thirds of the teachers believed that parents had

more say in educational matters.

(pp# 11-14)

Rand found that principals and administrators felt they
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were acting as facilitators more than previously.

They per-

ceived that they uere more actively involved in allocating
re-

sources and in helping teachers to plan than before,
(p. 14)

Information concerning student achievement uas not

available from Rand since the analysis of achievement test
scores uas not yet completed.
The findings also indicate that some uork needs to be

done in bringing information to parents, although some progress
had been made.

In 1972 half the parents did not knou that they

could transfer their children to neu schools.

never heard of the project numbered 17%.

reduced to 10% by 1973.

By Spring,

Parents uho had

This figure had been

1973, 80% of parents under-

stood that they could transfer their children, but 21% still
did not knou uhich program their children uere enrolled, (p. 15)

There is little to comment on concerning these figures.
The information is more precise and more broad than the findings
of this study, but the tuo tend to bear each other out.

The

enthusiasm of teachers for the program and the changing role
of administrators are significant points of agreement betueen

the tuo investigations.
The importance of these findings is much smaller to

this study than it uill be to Rand's.

They uould have been

investigation
quite important if ue could have concluded from our

that

a

Chapter

Rock.
true voucher program uas in operation in Alum
V

reached.
uill outline uhy this conclusion uas not
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CHAPTER

\l

CONCLUSIONS
Section

1

An Evaluation of the Alum Rock Project

There is no question that a number of positive changes

have occured in the Alum Rock schools as

result of their

a

participation in the experimental voucher project.

The admin-

istrators of the project, the representatives of the local
teachers* union, and the building principals are in general

agreement that the following changes have occured.
Parental involvement in the schools increased.

became more involved in decision making.

Parents

They made known to

the mini-schools their desires relating to educational pro-

gramming.
Parental interest in the schools has always been high,
Mr, 0*Berg, one of the principals interviewed, noted that a

school levy has never failed in Alum Rock,

In addition, a

survey conducted by his school before the introduction of

vouchers found that

8Q$> of

the parents whose children were

attending Goss School felt that they had
the school

*

s

activities.

a

voice in directing

The survey serves to point up the

active
fact that vouchers have not caused parents to become
in school affairs.

Uhat they have done is provide an oppor-

involved in the eductunity for parents to become even more
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ation of their children,
second achievement of the voucher
experiment is the
democratization of management in the participating
schools.
Only one principal, Mr. Uilkens, reported that
A

his role has

remained unchanged.

Teachers have been given the responsibil-

ity for designing educational programs.

They have accepted

the responsibility willingly.
The designing of an educational program requires care-

ful long-term planning.

When teachers accepted the respons-

ibility for designing their own programs, they necessarily
took upon themselves the burden of performing such planning.
The decisions which teachers had to make in the process of

carrying out their newly expanded duties were decisions which

principals have traditionally had to make.

As teachers proved

that they were able to design, plan, and perform adequately,
the principals came more and more to resemble advisors and

facilitators.
In addition,

teachers have taken on many of the day

to day managerial responsibilities.

Disciplinary functions,

supply functions, and record keeping are responsibilities

which are flowing away from principals and towards teachers.
A

third achievement of the voucher experiment is the

creation of diversity in program development and in classroom
design.

The field study indicated that there is somewhat
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greater diversity among programs than there uas before the
introduction of education vouchers#

Teachers began to ex-

periment with novel program designs as soon as vouchers provided the funds to do so, (See pp. 114-7,)
Finally, the voucher experiment has enabled teachers
to become more creative in their approaches to instructional

problems.

The funds provided by the project have bought the

equipment and materials necessary to make educational creativity possible.
In every one of these achievements, the voucher exper-

iment is a proximate cause.
the schools.

Parents uere heavily involved in

Teachers uere aching for the means to use their

creativity in the creation of neu educational programs and in
the development of neu classroom techniques.

Both principals

and teachers uere uilling to experiment uith innovative man-

agement techniques.
All these things uere ready to happen.

blem uas funding.

The only pro-

Local property tax receipts, supplemented

by state and federal grants, uere enough to keep the district

going but no more.
The voucher project provided the funds required to

take the district beyond the subsistence level.

expenditures in 1972-3 uere $1,700,000.
$3,000,000.

Voucher

In 1973-4 they uere

Approximately half of these amounts went to the
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classrooms of participating schools.

Given the poverty of the

district, its potential for change, and the purposes
of the
funding, it is difficult to imagine that the project
would not

produce many benefits.
The funding which the project brought to the district
has produced these benefits,

Uhat part have the vouchers

themselves played in the success of the project?
appears to be "very little."

The answer

The funds to be distributed to

classrooms were divided among the children to be educated
and were called vouchers.

Beyond that, they bear no resembl-

ance to the vouchers discussed in Chapters

I

and II.

In each of the voucher proposals presented on pages

11-13, vouchers were understood to be a result of the division
of a district’s available educational funds among all the

school-aged children in the district.

In some cases the value

of a low-income child’s voucher may be increased; in others

the division remains equal.

A

voucher is not an additional

It is each child’s share of the available educational

grant.

budget.

Vouchers were not used in Alum Rock.

The community’s

educational funds were distributed as usual, directly to the
schools.

Additional federal funds were granted to the schools

them.
in proportion to the number of students attending

semantic.
The difference between these two is not merely
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Suppose there is a school filled with
incompetent teachers.
Suppose also that many members of the community
recognize them
as incompetent and choose not to send
their children
there.

As a result, the school is operating at
only half of its

capacity
In a true voucher system,

this school will not receive

enough funds to keep all of its teachers.
go.

Some uill have to

The market moves money auay from perceived incompetence

and forces incompetent teachers out of the schools.
In Alum Rock, the school uill receive its full oper-

ating budget.

Teachers must be paid.

The school uill not

receive as much additional money for materials as others,
but it can continue to operate.

In this case, the market is

not permitted to uork against perceived incompetence.

The

market can only uithold excess funds.
That Alum Rock*s vouchers have little to do with com-

petition is demonstrated by the fact that there is only one

middle school participating in the program.

Federal funds

are being paid to the school in the form of vouchers, but it
is not competing to get them.

presented in Chapter

I,

In any of the seven proposals

the statement "only one school in this

district is participating in the voucher program" uould be
nonsense.

Uithin the conceptual framework of

a

true voucher

system, such a statement cannot be taken seriously.
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The same statement can be made in Alum
Rock because
the word "voucher" is being used entirely
differently.

Other differences between the Alum Rock project
and

current voucher models have been commented on previously
(see pp, 67-76).

The only one of these to be treated here

is the fact that no private schools may participate in the

Alum Rock program.

If no private schools are participating,

one wonders if there is any need for vouchers at all, either
in the Alum Rock sense or in the usual sense.

A

completely

public system can be operated much more simply.
The city of Tacoma, Washington has recently adopted a

free choice system.

Parents may send their children to any

school in the city provided there is room.
to stay in their neighborhood school
in it.

Children who wish

are guaranteed a place

The city supplies transportation.

Budgetary adjust-

ments are made when needed to insure that all children have
equal educational facilities.
The Tacoma system is not a voucher system and no one
has claimed that it is.

Yet, if federal funds were removed

from the Alum Rock program, it would resemble Tacoma*s free

choice system in every important detail.
The Alum Rock project has many fine achievements to
its credit.

Unfortunately, providing

a

future voucher plans is not one of them.

working model for
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Section

2

The Current Status of Vouchers

The controversy uhich surrounds the topic
of education

vouchers has moved from the educational journals to
the state

legislatures.

Fifteen states have considered implementing

voucher programs.

Opposition from the NEA and the AFT has

been strong and consistent.

Proponents of voucher plans have

been able to score only one victory,
Ross (1973) reports the following legislative action.
In California, the legislature rejected a bill uhich would

have established a five year experimental voucher project

which would have permitted parents to send their children to
any public or private school of their choice.
The Connecticut legislature passed a bill which permits

six districts to apply to the Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare for scholarship funds.

voucher program.

The program is called a

Since it has no relationship to vouchers

as understood here, passage of this bill is in no way a victory

for voucher proponents.
The state of Delaware was considering

a

bill which

would have authorized a statewide voucher program permitting

non-public schools to participate.

The bill was stricken

from the calendar.
An administrative decision has been made in Hawaii
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to observe developments in voucher
programs in other states,

but not to participate for the present.
In Kansas,

the legislature defeated a bill which would

have authorized the state to grant vouchers worth $300 to

students attending schools teaching courses approved by the
state board of education.
The Maryland legislature passed a bill which permitted

the state to aid non-public schools through voucher payments.

After passing the legislature the bill was presented to

a

general referendum and was defeated by the voters.
In 1972 the Massachusetts legislature asked for a

report on the feasibility of adopting
all schools.

a

voucher plan open to

The report was not received by the prescribed

date and the measure automatically failed.

The State Supreme

Court ruled that the measure would have been unconstitutional.
If parochial schools were made ineligible, the Court thought

the bill would be acceptable.
The Missouri legislature rejected a bill which would

have permitted tuition reimbursement to private school students

through the use of vouchers.
In New York, a study on the feasibility of implementing
a

voucher plan was submitted to the legislature, but no action

was taken.
to
The Ohio legislature has authorized a committee
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study the possibility of developing
a voucher plan in the state.
In Tennessee, a bill uhich
uould have authorized the
state to use vouchers as part of the
state program to aid local
districts uas rejscted by the legislature.
In

1972, the Texas legislature authorized

vouchers to be undertaken.

a

study on

The report uas due by the end of

the 1973 session, but no committee uas appointed.
The Uest Virginia

uould have authorized

a

legislature defeated

a

bill uhich

voucher plan uhich included private

schools
A

committee of the Uisonsin legislature has completed

a

report on education vouchers uhich had not been submitted at the
time of Ross* report.
The only state uhich has shoun a uillingness to exper-

iment uith vouchers is Neu Hampshire.

Seven districts have

applied to the National Institute of Education for planning
grants in order to become more fully informed as to the probable
impact of

a

voucher test.

The results of the study uill be

presented to the people of the districts for approval in March,
1975.

If approved,

proposals for implementation uill be pre-

sented in Washington.

The test uill not take place until

September, 1975 and then only in those districts uhich vote to
test the concept.

Information regarding the proposed test uas

made available by William H. Milne, Neu Hampshire Voucher Project

Director
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If

there are no administrative problems, the Neu Hamp-

shire project will begin in September, 1975.
hope that

evaluated.

a

It

offers the

true voucher plan can be tested and the results
If the

theoretical considerations in the first

part of this paper are valid, there is every reason to believe

that the Neu Hampshire project uill be successful.
The proposal for Neu Hampshire vouchers most closely

resembles the CSPP Proposal.

The value of a voucher uill be

determined by dividing the communities* educational resources
by the number of students to be educated, uith one important

proviso.

Any additional expense incurred by an influx of private

school students uill be absorbed by the federal government.
For example,

a

community of 5,000 students, 1,000 of

uhom attend private schools, uill continue to fund its 4,000

public school students.

The federal government uill fund the

private school students uhoseschools participate in the test,

provided that the private schools are non-sectarian.

In this

uay, vouchers uill represent each student's share of the

available educational budget.
vouchers represented

a

share of

In Alum Rock,
a

it uill be recalled,

federal grant, the school

budgets remaining unchanged.
program
The present timetable for implementing the
uill involve
indicates that the first year of testing, 1975-6,
During 1976-7 and thereafter, non-sectarian
only public schools.

private schools are eligible to participate.

The safeguards
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against discrimination, including an EVA which
are so much an
,
essential part of the CSPP Proposal, are reproduced

in the Neu

Hampshire plan.

If the various

projects in Neu Hampshire are

implemented and if they reproduce the conditions projected by
the CSPP model, the participating communities will provide ar

excellent test of the validity of the principles which are the

foundation of the CSPP plan.
If

New Hampshire can demonstrate that the use of educ-

ational vouchers can invigorate the educational enterprise, it
is possible that some of the legislative action reported will

be reversed.

Whether education vouchers are to be the wave of

the future or another passing fashion may be known in

years.

The idea deserves to be tested.

a

few
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